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From Pont d' Avignon to Ponte Vecchio
The Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union and 
the Member States through Principles of Public International Law
Dr. Christoph U. Schmid, EUI Florence
"(...) The point of legal institutions is to set up a framework that facilitates and 
enhances the public use of reason; a structure of discussion which must not be 
deformed either through external or internal coercion and which allows the 
continuing of public discourse when shared understandings of lesser generality 
have broken down."
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 1993, p. 41.
I. Introduction
In 1974, in the famous "Solange" decision of the Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC)', a serious conflict between the EC-Treaty (TEC) and the German 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) came to light for the first time. It remains unresolved 
and to a considerable extent threatens the good relationship between both legal 
orders and their highest courts. On the German side, the FCC, in its role as the 
guardian of the Grundgesetz and in line with its jurisprudence on foreign and se­
curity policy in general,* 2 *claims for itself the exceptional competence to review 
European law to be applied on German territory in the light of the constitutional 
"integration clauses" (imposing basic requirements on the participation of Ger­
many in the EC and the Union). On the contrary, on the European side, the Euro­
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) has always regarded such a competence as incom­
patible with its own jurisdiction and, therefore, as a breach of the EC-Treaty. 
Even though the FCC has raised the threshold conditions for its activation in the 
Solange II decision,’ it has up to now never ceased to insist on the existence of 
such a competence.J Now, in the Banana conflict, the competence could actually
* For valuable suggestions I am most grateful to Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Carol Harlow, Christian Joerges, 
Karlheinz Ladeur, Agustin Menendez Pelayo, Bruno Simma and Francis Snyder. For the correction of the 
English version, I wish to thank Richard Burnley.
'BVerfGE 37, 271 - Solange I.
2See H. Schwarz. Die verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle der AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 1995.
^BVerfGE 73. 339 (374 et seq.) - Solange II.
“'See the following up decision on the Maastricht treaty in: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
(BVerfGE) 89, 155 - Maastricht. Among the rich literature on the conflict since the Maastricht judgement see 
Bleckmann/Pieper, Recht der In ternational Wirtschaft 1993, 969; Boom, American J. of Comparative Law 
(1995), 17; Cremer, Europarecht 1995, 21; Everting, Integration 1994, 165; idem, Gediichtnisschrift fiir Gra- 



























































































be made use of for the first time: The administrative court of Frankfurt has re­
quested the FCC to review some provisions of the EC banana regime.* 5 which it 
considers to be at odds with the freedoms of property and profession enshrined in 
the Grundgesetz.6
In a recent contribution, the relationship between the ECJ and the FCC has 
been compared to the Cold War logic of "mutual assured destruction".7 Unlike 
the mere threat to do so, actually setting aside a European act as unconstitutional 
would be very hazardous since other States could follow this example ("domino 
effect") relying on some reciprocity rationale, thus putting an end to legal uni­
formity, which is a basic requirement of the rule of law within the EC. With re­
gard to the constraints of globalisation,8 this could generate fatal economic and 
geopolitical consequences even for Germany itself. However, the scenario of the 
mutual dissuasion should not be viewed in only the negative sense. Thus, the de­
auslàndisches òffentliches Recht und Vôlkerrecht 1994, 1; Gersdorf, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1994. 675; 
Gòtz, Juristenzeitung 1993, 1081; Grimm, Recht der Arbeit 1996, 66 = Columbia J. of European Law 3 (1996), 
229 (English version); Ip sen, Europarecht 1994, 1,9; Heintzen, Archi v fiir Òffentliches Recht 119 (1994), 564; 
Herdegen, CML. Rev. 31 (1994). 235; Hirsch, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1996. 2457, 2459; Horn, Deut­
sches Verwaltungsblatt 1995, 89; Hommelhoff/Kirchhof (ed.), Der Staatenverbund der Europàischen Union, 
1994; Kirchhof, Deutsche Richterzeitung, 1995, 253; E. Klein. Gedàchtnisschrift fiir Grabitz, 1995, 271; H. H. 
Klein, Maastrichter Vertrag und nationale Verfassungsgerichtsrechtsprechung, 1993; Kokott, Archiv fiir Òf­
fentliches Recht 119 (1994) 207; Kònig, Zeitschrift fiir auslàndisches òffentliches Recht und Vôlkerrecht 1994, 
17; Koopmans, Nederlands Juristen Blad 1994, 245; Lenz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1993. 3038; Mac 
Cormick, Juristenzeitung 1995, 17; Meesen, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1994, 549; Oppermann. Deutsches 
Verwaltungsblatt 1994, 901; Pfrang, Das Verhàltnis des deutschen Rechts zum Gemcinschaftsrccht nach dem 
Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. 1996; Rodriguez Iglesias, Europàische Grundrechte 1996, 
125; Schneider, Archiv fiir Òffentliches Recht 119 (1994), 294; Schroder M., Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 994, 
316; Schroder W., Zeitschrift fiir Rechtsvergleichung 1994, 143; Schwarze, Neue Justiz 1994, 1; Sendler, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1996, 825; Steinberger, Festschrift fiir Bernhardt, 1995, 1313; Steindorff, Eu- 
ropàisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 1993, 341; Streinz, Europaischc Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsrecht 1994. 
329; idem, in: Ipsen et al. (ed.), Verfassungsrecht im Wandel, 1995, 663; Tomuschat, Europàische Grundrechte 
1993, 489; Voss, Recht der In ternational Wirtschaft 1996, 324; A. Weber, Festschrift fiir Everling, 1995, 
1625; Weiler, Jahrbuch fiir Òffentliches Recht 1996, 91 = Festschrift fiir Everling. 1995. voi. 2, 1651 (English 
version); Winkelmann (ed.). Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1994; Wittkowski, Bayeri- 
sche Verwaltungsblatter 1994, 35 et seq.; Zuck, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1994, 978; Zuleeg, Juristenzei­
tung 1994, 1.- See, for the similar debate in Ireland. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: the Constitutional bounda­
ries of the EC. 1997. For an overall view see Fédération International du droit européen (ed.), ‘Le droit consti- 
tutionel national et l'intégration européenne', 1996.
5Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt a. M., Europàische Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 182 (19 et seq.); for 
comments see A. Weber. Europàische Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 165; P. M. Huber, Europàische 
Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 517; Classen, Juristenzeitung 1997, 454; Vachek, Zeitschrift fiir 
Rechtsvergleichung 1997, 136.Zuleeg, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1997, 1201.
6In this context, the term "constitutional conflict" was first used by Voss, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 
1996, 324.- However, the conflict could also be solved on the public international law track, since the WTO- 
Dispute Settlement Body, in its resolution of 25/9/1997, has found several violations of GATT and GATS. It is 
to be expected, therefore, that the EC will modify the Banana regime in order to comply with the WTO resolu­
tion. Furthermore, such resolution should have direct effect in Community law, see Eeckhout, CML.Rev. 34 
(1997), 11; C. Schmid, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, 190.
7Weiler/Haltern, 37 Harvard Int. L. J. (1996), 411,446; Weiler/Haltern/Mayer, W.Eur.Politics, July 1995, 4, 3 
et seq.




























































































velopment of the ECJ’s human rights jurisprudence would mainly be a response to 
the challenges by national courts, especially the FCC.9
Even though this scenario of mutual destruction has worked as an expedient up 
to now, and may even have contributed to the evolution of the human rights juris­
prudence of the ECJ, 10 this article argues that a Cold War relationship between 
the highest courts of both sides and the legal uncertainty arising therefrom is to be 
considered as unacceptable in a highly integrated polity like the EC. Therefore, 
an attempt will be made to "re-juridify" the conflict in order to avoid negative 
consequences on integration. First, the positions of both sides will be briefly ex­
pounded. This will confirm the premise that the conflict has strong structural ele­
ments, in that it is but a logical consequence of the different views on the rela­
tionship between both legal orders and the supremacy of EC law. This leads to 
the insight that a solution is only to be found by means of a theoretical recon­
struction, which sheds light on the logical well-foundedness of the different 
premises. This reconstruction reaches the conclusion that the relationship of both 
legal orders is to be regarded as dualistic. Starting from this basis, the central 
premises for the resolution of the conflict will be developed: Since there is no hi­
erarchical sub- or supraordination between both legal orders, both may not try to 
subject one another, but must respect each other's mutual autonomy. Furthermore, 
the ECJ must recognise that parts of its premises are inconsistent: Supremacy 
ends where fundamental constitutional features of the MSS are at stake. In such 
case, a solution may only be found by cooperation, according to which the two 
judiciaries have to agree on a constitutional standard (e.g. in human rights protec­
tion) acceptable for both (here called "concordance solution"). If a concordance 
solution were to fail, the cooperation between both legal orders must be pursued 
on a higher, third level, through a conciliation mechanism. Even though the es­
tablishment of such a procedure is to be left to the European legislator, this article 
will show that a MS can already claim it de lege lata. This solution will be based 
on the "concrétisation", by PIL principles, of the EC’s duties of solidarity and of 
respect for national identities of the MSS enshrined in Arts. 5 TEC and F I TEU.
^However. further ahead, Weiler and Haltern concede the limits of their comparison: There is no "non- 
proliferation treaty" in EC law, so that several constitutional courts could initiate a Cold War at the same time; 
moreover, courts are not the only actors - rather, governments might use the threat that their courts could set 
aside a European act as a tactical weapon in a bargaining process at EC level (37 Harvard Ini. L. J. (1996), 411, 
438 et seq.).
/0Generally shared view, see Ipsen. EuR 1994, 1 (9f.): Ossenbiihl. DVB1. 1993, 753 (762). Weiler/Lockhart. 32 
Common Market L. Rev. (1993) 579; Bleckniann/Pieper, RTW 1993, 969. 9761.; qualifying this view however 




























































































II. The genesis of constitutional conflicts
1. The integration clauses of the Grundgesetz and their control by
the FCC
According to the Basic Law, the transfer of state sovereignty to the EC through 
the German statutes of ratification of the EC treaties is subject to indispensable 
conditions. In contrast to the new Art. 23 Basic Law, the old Art. 24 Basic Law 
(which is still relevant for the EC treaties and any secondary law based on them) 
did not name them explicitly. Rather, they must be defined pursuant to common 
methodological principles. Thereby, it must first be recognised that these provi­
sions which give constitutional authorisation to integration may not be regarded 
as a breach of the constitution, but have to be read in the light of its other provi­
sions, particularly the so called "eternity clause" of Art. 79 III Basic Law.”  This 
contains a reference to human dignity and the value of human life (Art. 1 Basic 
Law) as well as the fundamental federal, democratic, social principles on which 
the Federal Republic of Germany is based (Art. 20 Basic Law) and which may 
not even be set aside by the constitutional legislator acting by unanimity. In case 
of conflict, the conflicting principles must be balanced so that each of them re­
tains a maximum of effectiveness (the so called device of "practical concor­
dance"12). The new Art. 23 Basic Law, introduced before the ratification of the 
Maastricht treaty, now incorporates these limits to integration explicitly. There­
fore, it may be understood as an abstract 'balancing formula' along the lines of the 
doctrine of practical concordance.
Like any other constitutional provisions, the integration clauses in Art. 23 and 
former Art. 24 Basic Law have to be monitored by the guardian of the Grundge­
setz: the FCC. This is a clear obligation of the court from which it cannot dis­
pense itself. Therefore, in the light of German constitutional law, the FCC did not 
have any alternative to the exercise of such control over EC law to be applied in 
Germany. Since direct control is not procedurally provided for, the control can 
only be exercised in an indirect way, i.e. over the "bridge" of the review of na­
tional ratification statutes: To the extent that a European act exceeds the limits of 
the integration clauses, the ratification statute (having the rank of standard law, 
inferior to the constitution) is void, and as a result, the European act is devoid of 
legal force on national territory.”  As will be shown in more detail, this mecha­
nism, however, does not in principle affect Germany's obligations under EC law.
” See Streinz, Bundesvcrfassungsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz und Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht 
(abridged: Grundrechtsschutz). 1989, 247 et seq.
2̂The father of this famous concept is former constitutional court judge Konrad Hesse. See Hesse, Grundziige 
des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 20th ed. 1995, at No. 72, 28.




























































































2. Autonomy and supremacy of EC law
As opposed to Art. 23 Basic Law, the EC treaties did and do not deal with the 
interface between EC and national law in any way. Rather, all related questions 
remained to be resolved by jurisprudence. To this end, the ECJ developed over 
the years the well-known doctrines of autonomy, direct effect, supremacy, pre­
emption, direct effect of directives, directive-conforming interpretation ("indirect 
effect") and state liability. They can be reconstructed in terms of a supranational 
"conflict of laws", relying on the techniques elaborated in private international 
law.74 As is known, all these doctrines became generally accepted by national 
courts, albeit after strong resistance by some French and German courts. These 
doctrines have brought about the "constitutionalisation of the treaties", thereby 
promoting integration even during years of political stagnation.JS However, two 
elements of these doctrines turned out to be in potential conflict with national 
constitutions: the unlimited autonomy and supremacy of EC law.
a) Autonomy
Already in the first years of the EC's existence, the ECJ defined its concept of 
the autonomy of the EC law:
"The conclusion to be drawn (...) is that the EC constitutes a new legal order of internatio­
nal law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and which binds both their nationals and themselves."* 16
In the first place, the autonomy of EC law means that - like any international 
treaty - the EC treaties are principally not subject to restrictions by the internal 
law of the contracting parties. This is even true for requirements contained in na­
tional constitutions. In particular, the sole reference to the need for ratification in 
Art. 247 TEC can not bring about the reception of such national requirements into 
EC law. Thus, in the case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,17 the ECJ stated:
"Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of 
measures adopted by the institutions of the EC would have an adverse effect on the uni­
formity and efficacy of EC law. In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent 
source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overriden by rules of national law, how­
ever framed, without being deprived of its character as EC law and without the legal basis 
of the EC itself being called in question. Therefore the validity of a EC measure or its effect 
within a MS cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental 
rights as formulated by constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitu­
tional structure."
,4See C. Schmid, Vertical and diagonal conflicts in the Europeanisation process, Florence 1997 (forthcoming 
as a Commission document).
76Since Les Verts, case 294/82, ECR 1986, 1339, 1365 (confirmed in opinion 1/91, ECR 1-1991, 6084, 6102), 
the ECJ refers to the treaties as the Community's constitution. As to the concept of constitutionalisation, see 
Weiler's classic, The Transformation of Europe, Yale L.J. 100 (1991 ), 2403.
i6ECJ cases 26/62, ECR 1963, 1 - Van Gend & Loos; and 6/64. ECR 1964, 1250 - Costa/Enel.




























































































Interestingly, Advocate General Warner advocated the contrary position, the 
socalled "Hypothekentheorie" (mortgage theory), some years later:
"The court has already said in general terms that is cannot uphold measures incompatible 
with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of MSS (...) I would 
be inclined to refine on this and to say that a fundamental right recognized and protected by 
the Constitution of a MS must be recognized an protected also in EC law. The reason lies 
in the fact that, as has often been held by the Court (...), EC law owes its very existence to 
a partial transfer of sovereignty by each of the MSS to the EC. No MS can, in my opinion, 
be held to have included in that transfer power for the EC to legislate in infringement of 
rights protected by its own Constitution. To hold otherwise would involve attributing to a 
MS the capacity, when ratifying the Treaty, to flout its own Constitution, which seems to 
me impossible (...)"«
However, in the Hauer judgement the Court strongly opposed this view by 
confirming its former opinion:
"As the Court declared in its judgment Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the question of 
a possible infringement of fundamental rights by a measure of the EC institutions can only 
be judged in the light of EC law itself. The introduction of special criteria for assessment 
stemming form the legislation or constitutional law of a particular MS would, by damaging 
the substantive unity and efficacy of EC law, lead inevitably to the destruction of the unity 
of the Common Market and the jeopardising of the cohesion of the EC."19
This view of the Court has remained unchallenged, and has ever since consti­
tuted the basis of its jurisprudence.20 *Moreover, the democratic homogenity of the 
EC and its MSS and particularly the fact that the fundamental principles en­
shrined in Art. 79 III Basic Law are also acknowledged in the ECJ's jurispru­
dence do not mean that these principles are relevant to the EC in exactly the 
shape they have been given by the FCC.2J The fact that the ECJ has often had 
recourse to national constitutional provisions in order to shape EC law (especially 
human rights) does not prove the contrary. For, in this sense, national constitu­
tional law is not a legal source of EC law, but merely a "law-finding source". If 
EC law depended on the consent of 15 national courts, its uniform and efficient 
application would finally be impossible.
Beyond that, the ECJ and parts of the literature sustain the proposition that the 
EC has, either with its genesis or through the process of constitutionalisation of 
the treaties, emancipated itself from the national ratification statutes, i.e. cut the 
ties to its basis in public international and national constitutional law.22 Already 
the statement in Costa/ ENEL in which the ECJ talked for the first time of an
«Case 7/76, ECR 1976, 1229, 1236 - Irca.
«Case 44/79, ECR 1979, 3727 at 14 - Hauer.
20See recently Case C-473/93, ECR 1996,1-3207, at 37 et seq. - Commission/ Luxemburg.
2JThis view is however held by the German author Eibach, Das Recht der Europaischen Gemeinschaften als 
Prüfungsgegenstand des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1986, 105 et seq.
22See Everling's famous essay; Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Gemeinschaft noch Herren der Ver- 
trüge?, in: Festschrift fiir Mosler, 1983, 173 et seq. (190); idem, Deutsches Verwaitungsblatt 1993, 936 (942); 




























































































autonomous legal order and not any longer of a special order of international law. 
could be understood in this sense. In the literature, the "emancipation thesis" was 
mainly advocated by Ipsen in his famous "Gesamtaktstheorie" (collective act 
theorie). Thereafter, the genesis of the EC system does not primarily depend on 
the national ratification statutes as in the case of ordinary PIL treaties. Rather, 
what is crucial is the German participation in the collective act establishing the 
EC which is based only on Art. 24 I GG and, for this reason, did not need to 
comply with the rest of the Grundgesetz, so that any problem of compatibility 
with it could not emerge at all. In the later jurisprudence, the emanicpation per­
spective tends to underlie the ECJ's reference to the Treaties as the EC's 
"constitution", a term traditionally reserved for the "higher law" of a sovereign 
state. An even stronger indication in this direction can be found in the more recent 
first EEA-opinion whereafter a certain hard core of the treaties could not even be 
changed by the European legislator.23 According to this view, the MSS are no 
longer the uncontested "masters of the treaty"2-', and the EC is becoming a widely 
autonomous polity, its law being no longer subject to unlimited modification or 
control by the MSS. As a result, MSS could ensure the EC's respect for their 
Constitutions' limits to integration only collectively through legislative action, in­
cluding those Treaty modifications the ECJ would still allow.
As far as the FCC is concerned, it is true that, in its jurisprudence, it has also 
ascribed to the EC system the quality of an autonomous legal order.25 However, 
in substance, it denies a complete autonomy of EC law in this sense by maintain­
ing the competence to control the constitutionality of EC law to be applied inter­
nally. This would not be possible, if the "bridge" (Kirchhof) of national statutes of 
ratification over which the judicial control over EC law is exercised by national 
constitutional courts would be cut. For, then, this bridge would have become a 
bridge in the Avignon style, on which the States may still wish to dance but which 
does not lead anywhere any longer.
b) Supremacy
From the autonomous character of EC law, the ECJ has also deduced its su­
premacy vis a vis national law:
"The integration into the laws of each MS of provisions which derive from the EC and 
more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a 
corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system 
accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent 
with that legal system. The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, 
could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal pro­
23Opinion, 1/91, ECR 1-1991. 6084 at 6102.
24As to the various meanings of this concept see Heintzen. Archiv des Offenllichcn Rechts 119 (1994), 564.




























































































visions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as EC law and without the 
legal basis of the EC itself being called into question („.)"2S
The formula "domestic legal provisions, however framed" clearly shows that 
the ECJ has in mind a primacy of EC law with respect to any national law, includ­
ing constitutional law. The ECJ's use of the term 'constitution' seems to confirm 
this conclusion as well. So, from the ECJ’s perspective, supremacy would encom­
pass the integration clauses of national constitutions and the limits to integration 
stated by them. However, if this were entirely correct, the EC could actually dis­
regard these limits by adopting, under a majority regime, measures contrary to 
them; once the ECJ would have accepted a measure as compatible with EC law, 
the MSS would dispose of no other remedy against it. As will be shown in more 
detail, MSS should however have at their disposal a further device for the judicial 
protection of their Constitutions. This device will render necessary the limitation, 
to a certain extent, of primacy of European law over national constitutional limits 
to integration.
In the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality an­
nexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam,26 7 the Council has expressed the view that subsidiarity 
and proportionality rationales cannot be drawn upon in order to limit the primacy of Euro­
pean law: "The application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality shall respect 
the general provisions and the objectives of the Treaty, particularly as regards the maintain­
ing of the acquis communautaire and the institutional balance; it shall not affect the princi­
ples developed by the Court of Justice regarding the relationship between national and EC 
law, and it should take into account Article F(4) of the Treaty on European Union, accord­
ing to which the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives 
and carry through its policies". However, this provision is not meant to limit the compe­
tence of control exercised by national constitutional courts by virtue of their constitu- 
tions.2S
3. Consequences for the control of EC law by national constitutional 
courts
The premises of the irrelevance, in EC law, of national limitations to integration 
and of the unlimited supremacy of EC law are considered to imply that there is no 
scope for the review of EC law by national courts. Particularly, such a power 
would seem to be incompatible with the ECJ's position of ultimate umpire as to 
the interpretation and validity of EC law, as laid down in Art. 164-177 TEC.
This function of the ECJ is indeed indispensable to guarantee uniform application of EC 
law throughout the EC. Therefore, the reference procedure in Art. 177 TEC is particularly
26Costa/Enel, Case 6/64, ECR 1964, 586.
27See Treaty of Amsterdam, final version, CONF/4007/97, TA/P/d 28, No. 2.
2sFor a different view, see Hasselbacli. Juristenzeitung 1997, 942. However, it should be noted that even an 
explicit statement by the Community legislator as to an unlimited primacy of European law would not change 
the constitutional conflict in any way, since its origin in national constitutional law would remain unaffected. 
Futhermore, German organs would not be allowed to vote for such a provision in the Council, since it would 




























































































important, since it ensures that the ECJ is consulted before a potentially divergent interpre­
tation of EC law by national courts. Within EC law, the ECJ's monopoly of interpretation 
clearly comprises the review of the Treaty's legislative competence provisions as well.29
From this perspective, if not the review procedure as such, at least the finding 
of a EC act as unconstitutional by a national court would clearly be in breach of 
EC law. It could be sanctioned by a treaty violation procedure (Art. 169 TEC) 
and other devices, including the imposition of a fine (Art. 171 TEC).
III. A theoretical reconstruction of the conflict
The analysis in the last chapter shows that both positions are based on different 
conceptual premises and reach different results as to the degree of autonomy and 
supremacy of European law and the control competence of national constitutional 
courts according to a coherent reasoning. Thus, we seem to face a structural 
conflict which, by the means of positive law, can only be alleviated, but not re­
solved in all cases. However, a definitive opinion can only be delivered after a 
further analysis which transcends the internal perspective of each legal order and 
allows for an overall assessment in which the premises themselves of the two 
positions are critically reviewed. Such an analysis must go beyond positive law 
and resort to a theoretical reconstruction of the conflict. Only such an assessment 
will finally be capable of discerning the potential of both positions for conflict 
resolution and of developing, on that basis, a plausible proposal at the level of 
positive law.
29For a different, but unconvincing view, see Schilling, 37 Harvard Int. L.J. (1996). 389. 406 et seq. and idem, 
Zeitschrift fur Rechtsvergleichung 1997. 96 et seq. According to Theodor Schilling, it is possible that a court of 
an international organisation which does not possess legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz may well be endowed 
with judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. i.e. may well be the ultimate umpire with respect to the interpretation of 
legislative competence provisions. However, this judicial competence would include the power of deliberately 
exceeding the legislative competence of the organisation (!). In Community law. however, the existence of such 
a judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the ECJ would be uncertain: Arts. 173-177 TEC might be relied on in fa­
vour of it. whereas Arts. 4 and 164 TEC would point against it. Now. this problem could be solved by according 
the ECJ only a "formal", and not a "substantive" judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz', as a result, national courts 
would retain a substantive judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which would ultimately allow them to review the 
ECJ's decisions on the interpretation of legislative competence provisions. This argumentation seems ill- 
founded. First, it is true that the Community is an order of limited competences and therefore, does not have 
legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz (although one might read another conclusion into the ECJ's first opinion on 
the European Economic Area. Opinion 1/91. ECR 1-1991, 6079. which would however be ultra vires). Sec­
ondly, however, it should be clear that the ECJ was given the power, in the interest of legal unity, to decide as 
the ultimate umpire also on competence issues. This power even includes very wide interpretations of legisla­
tive competence provisions, which might be considered as ultra vires by some. but. nevertheless, according to 
normal standards of public international law. are binding unless the transgression is essential and manifest 
(see, specifically on this problem. Streinz, Grundrechtsschutz, 1989, 324. text at fn. 177). Now. it is wrong to 
deduce from the competence of (even extensive) interpretation an explicit competence to deliberately exceed 
the bonds of limited legislative competences. Therefore, it is already not necessary to draw on Arts. 4 and 164 
in order to justify a limitation o (such a judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. since it simply does not exist. For this 
very reason, there is no need to differentiate between a formal and a substantive judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
either. Finally, it seems self-evident that Schilling's view would be prone to destroy legal unity in the Com­
munity and therefore counteract the intentions of the fathers of the Treaty.- See also the convincing response to 
Schilling by Weiler/Haltern, 37 Harvard Int. L.J. (1996), 411. 423 et seq. For the origins of the concept of 




























































































The point of departure for this reconstruction must be the theoretical alterna­
tives which exist with respect to the relationship of both legal orders: (1) EC law 
is only an annex of each national legal order in an overall monistic system; (2) the 
inverse situation: in a monistic system, EC law is supraordinated over national 
law, and finally (3) both legal orders stand in a dualistic juxtaposition. Now, for 
the sake of further analysis, the theoretical devices of a certain school must be 
chosen. In the present context, the devices of the Pure Theory of Law developed 
by Hans Kelsen, Adolf Merkel and their successors seems particularly well 
suited, since it is deliberately confined to the reconceptualisation of empirical 
phenomena, thus excluding as far as possible normative and especially ideologi­
cal considerations.30 31Besides that, the devices of institutional legal positivism, 
developed by Neil Mac Cormick and Ota Weinberger,37 were used in the litera­
ture. They will be included in this analysis, too.
1. Important basic concepts of the Pure Theory of Law
The Pure Theory of Law defines as a legal order an order of legal norms which 
has been recognised as a unity. The unity of this order is due to its deductability 
to a common reason of existence, a (fictitious) Grundnonn. In this hierarchical 
structure, it is the highest rule for law-creation, which commands the validity of 
all subordinated norms. In such a chain of validity, the subordinated norm also 
commands, besides its other contents, the validity of the norm subordinated to 
itself. In this conception, the simplest solution for C law would be to derive it 
from the Grundnonnen of the national constitutions of the founding countries 
(monism with supraordination of national law). Logically, it is also conceivable 
that, through a legal "revolution", i.e. the coming into existence of a new Grund­
nonn, EC law has emancipated itself from its national law base either right at the 
foundation of the EC or later on, and that it has taken its place above national law 
in a monistic system (monism with supraordination of EC law), or in juxtaposition 
to the latter (dualism).
However, according to Kelsen, besides the derivability from a common Grund- 
norm, a legal system presupposes that the efficiency of its norms is guaranteed 
through adequate sanctions. This requirement is based on the fact that a Grund- 
norm has a purely heuristic value. Thereafter, the recognition of a Grundnorm is 
only possible if a real system actually exists; for law is not created in the moment 
of its construction by legal science, but is given to it as a product of social and 
empirical processes.32 *So, what is needed is a constitution which, on the whole, is
30For a Pure Theory of Law reconstruction of supranationality see Grussmann, Grundnorm und Supranation- 
alitat, Rechtsstrukturelle Sichtweisen der europaischcn Integration, in: v. Danwitz et al. (eds.), Auf dem Wege 
zu einer europàischen Staatlichkeit, 1993, 47; Richmond, Preventing the Identity Crisis, Law and Philosophie 
1997, 377.
31MacCormickJ Weinberger, Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus, 19S5.





























































































efficient.-33 Drawing on Merkel, Wolf-Dietrich Grussmann however refutes this 
reasoning: The efficiency of an order of norms would only be an arbitrary crite­
rion for the heuristic value of the assumption of its validity.34 Only by foregoing 
this requirement, a theoretical analysis of old constitutions, with are no longer 
active at the moment of observation (e.g. Nazi or communist-GDR-law) would be 
possible.
This view must however be disputed. Law must, at least within the minimal 
bonds of the effiency criterion, take into account its social backround if it wants 
to be more than a theoretical castle in the air. In so far, an impure element has to 
be introduced into the Pure Theory of Law. This does not exclude the recognition 
of old constitutional orders, which are no longer efficient at present. Rather, their 
implications and "legacies" on the current legal order may be considered through 
intertemporal norms of conflict or other devices. The denial of the efficiency at 
the time of observation does not preclude a former effiency somewhere in the 
past. Thereafter, in order to recognise EC law as a legal system, its efficiency has 
to be scrutinised. If it is declined, EC law can only be regarded as a subordinated 
annex of national law within a monistic overall order. As a consequence thereof, 
the ECJ would be subordinated to national courts, and their claim of competence 
to review EC law which is to be applied within a State would be justified.
2. Monism with supraordination of national law?
In two remarkable recent contributions, Marcel Kaufmann35 and Theodor 
Schilling36 have denied EC law an effiency independent from national law, and 
therefore validity as an autonomous legal order.37 The supranational legal order 
would not possess this quality, because it would prove inefficient in hard con­
flicts. Nearly all constitutional or supreme courts would reserve to themselves a 
control competence on grounds of constitutionality (resp. other important features 
of national law). Since the EC does not to a large extent dispose of its own ad­
ministration and, therefore, has to rely on national administrations sworn to up­
hold their constitutions, EC law would not be able to impose itself over national 
law in cases of hard conflict. For this reason, only "nationalised EC law", i.e. EC 
law compatible with the critera of validity of national law and therefore applied 
by national administrations, would be efficient. As a consequence thereof, EC 
law would remain integrated in the chain of validity of the legal systems to which 
it owes its very existence: the national legal systems. Thus, the relationship of the 
two legal orders could be qualified as monistic, national law being supraordinated
33Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd. ed. 1960. 196 et seq.
34Grussmann, Grundnorm und Supranationalital. Rechtsslrukturelle Sichtweisen der europaischen Integration, 
in: v. Danwitz u.a. (eds.). Aul'dem Wege zu einer europaischen Staallichkeit, 1993, 47 (50) drawing on Merkl, 
Hans Kelsens System einer reinen Rechtslehre, Archiv des offentlichen Rechts 47 (1921), 171 (179).
35Kaufmann, Der Staat 1997. 521.
36Schilling, Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphtlosophie 1997, 568.




























































































to EC law. This interpretation would have the further advantage that it allows for 
the use of the potentials of democratic legitimacy of the nation states for the EC. 
Beyond that, this view does not overlook the critique that it conceives of EC law 
as an - not necessarily uniform - appendix of the national legal orders. However, 
it wants to avoid the threat of splitting by means of the self restraint of national 
law, ordained in "opening clauses" like Art. 23 GG, which mandate national law 
to take into account the needs of the EC through a "practical concordance" bal­
ancing approach. Thus, conflicts of validity between the two orders could be 
avoided, and conflicts would remain in the sphere of law; the conflict decision 
would not require a choice between law and non-law. Finally, giving the German 
constitutional court the responsability for European integration would mean put­
ting it into good hands.
This view, which regards EC law as "auesseres Staatsrecht" (external state 
law), does not match the European reality, though. For the strong position of the 
ECJ as the guardian of Communtiy law, and especially the competences of the 
EC for sanctions vis-à-vis MSS who disrespect EC law or the fundamental values 
and principles of the community order (Art. 169-171 TEC and new Art. 7 TEU) 
guarantee a degree of independent efficiency to the European legal order, which 
cannot be neglected even in the case of hard conflicts. It is true that it is irrele­
vant, in this context, that the case of an avoidance of EC law by a national court 
has never happened so far, and that it is even a duty for national organs under na­
tional law to avoid it happening (since all national systems provide only for the 
membership in a stable community in which the rule of law is respected), since 
these circumstances do not prove that "non-nationalised" community law would 
be sufficiently efficient. However, it is decisive that, even if this case actually 
happened, the EC, disposing of the sanctions provided for in Arts. 169 et seq. 
TEC, would not be without any defense against the disobeyance of its law. Apart 
from that, EC sanctions against a MS which fundamentally disobeys EC law, and 
thereby leaves the basis of the EC's self contained regime might, as ultima ratio, 
even be supplemented by national sanctions of other MSS (who would then act as 
a sort of trustor for the EC) pursuant to P1L.
Furthermore, a monism with supraordination of national law would presuppose 
that the EC is in principle vulnerable to any intervention by each MS, without 
having any defense. If a state decided to give up its constitutional self restraint 
with respect to the EC, no legal means would exist against this action. Thus, a 
MS could simply abolish the whole community with respect to itself by repealing 
the ratification statute; countermeasures according to Arts. 169 et seq. TEC 
would have to be viewed as "non-law" or at least as per se illegal, since they 
would not be compatible with the national Gnmdnonn; the EC would only exist 
by the grace of the MSS, and could not guarantee the essential uniformity of its 
law. As a result, the MS would have remained completely sovereign - which is a 
view that, since the last century, is not even held with respect to PIL, where only 




























































































literature38. This would clearly contradict reality once again. Moreover, by the 
assumption that the national legal order would be supraordinated to the EC one, 
the monistic theory blocks the only conflict solution available in practice: an 
equal cooperation between both orders and their courts. Finally, the argument ac­
cording to which only a monistic model with supraposition of national law would 
allow for the use of the democratic legitimacy potentials of the nation states for 
the EC is misleading in two senses. First, in the normal case of nationalised 
Community law, these potentials could be made use of according to any model. 
Then, with respect to the structural pecularities of the EC, the transfer of the le­
gitimacy of the nation state to the Community level is not even sufficient in order 
to realise democratic conditions at EC level. Rather, autonomous EC devices 
must be drawn upon to supplement the nation state based democratic legitimacy 
of the EC. It would therefore seem overstated making the choice of a monistic 
model dependent on it.
To sum up, the assumption of a lack of efficiency and monistic subordination of 
EC law under national law is untenable because of the EC's independent compe­
tence in imposing sanctions. Having thus recognised the status of EC law as an 
autonomous legal order with its own Grundnorm, only two alternatives remain: 
Either EC law is supraordinated to national law at the peak of a monistic struc­
ture, or the relationship between both legal orders can only be conceived of as 
dualistic.
3. Monism with supraposition of EC law or dualism?
As stated above, the functional theory adopted by the ECJ postulates the com­
plete autonomy of EC law from its constitutional and international law base, par­
ticularly from the national ratification statutes, and an unlimited supremacy of EC 
law over all national law, which would not be controllable by national courts. By 
stressing the autonomy of EC law, the Court does however not make a choice 
between a monistic model with supraordination of EC law or a dualistic model. It 
must be noted, though, that, logically, the autonomy of EC law in the sense of a 
juxtaposition of both orders - which would constitute a dualistic model - would 
not lead to an uncontrollable supremacy of EC law. Rather, such a model would 
continue to depend on a national norm opening its own legal order to community 
norms, a norm which could be controlled by constitutional courts like any other 
national law. Thus, in terms of the German legal order, the continuing validity of 
the ratification act which, together with Art. 23 GG, provides for its opening to­
wards EC law, would be required. Supremacy of EC law would only exist pursu­
ant to this constitutional authorisation.
By contrast, an unlimited and uncontrollable supremacy would logically only be 
possible within a monistic model, in which national law would be directly subor­
dinated to EC law. Only then could EC law itself determine its unlimited suprem­




























































































acy over national law, and the control of national courts could be excluded. The 
statements of some German authors seem indeed to go into this direction: Arts. 
23 and 24 would open the German legal order for a law from another source 
which does not depend on the continuing force of the ratification act, since EC 
law would impose itself pursuant to EC constitutional rules themselves.39 40Inciden­
tally, in terms of legal theory, there is no difference between this version of the 
functional model and a purely federal model, in which state and federal law is 
also derived from a common Grundnorm.
Facing the choice now between a monistic model with supraordination of EC 
law and a dualistic model, it must be conceded that the former can hardly be 
proven in the face of the actual development of the EC and the Union.'0 An 
emancipation and supraposition at the foundation stage would presuppose that the 
EC was created by some sort of pouvoir constituant41 as a federal state, or at 
least as some other form of autonomous polity - what Schilling called the "big 
bang theory" of EC law.42 *4Such a theory is simply not tenable, since the founda­
tion treaties have been concluded as normal PIL treaties and have been ratified as 
such by national parliaments. Conversely, with the establishment of a hierarchi­
cally superior system depriving them of their constitutional identity and sover­
eignty, the European nation states would have committed a clear and massive 
violation of their constitutions, which can hardly be implied from their action. 
Furthermore, as stated, even the ECJ was still explicitly referring to the PIL- 
character of the treaties in 1962;45 the term constitution was first used in 1986.'-' 
Thus, Schilling rightly critises the "bing bang theory" as a piece of legal meta­
physics and an ex-post rationalisation of developments which were neither fore­
seen nor intended at the foundation of the EC.
So, at best, an evolution towards the supraposition of EC law may have taken 
place a long time after the conclusion of the treaties through the constitutionalisa- 
tion process. But this hypothesis must be discarded as well. First, for reasons of 
legal certainty, one may rightly claim the need for a formal agreement of the MSS 
for such a far-reaching change of the EC’s status.45 But even if such a formal re­
quirement were waived, any expression of consent by the MSS would seem to be 
crucial. There are, however, no such indications. In particular, no emancipation of
"S ee  Everling, Feslschrift fur Bernhard, 1995, 1161 (1174 et seq.), relying also on Ipsen and Frowein.
40Simma, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 16 (1985). 111 (127); Streinz. Grundrechtsschutz, 1989, 
92 et seq.; Toniuschat, Europàische Grundrechte 1993, 489 (495); Blanke, Die dffentliche Verwaltung 1993, 
412 (419); Scholz, Neue Verwaltungsrechtszeitschrift 1993, 817 (818); Kenipen, Archiv des Volkerrechts 35 
(1997), 275 et seq. The FCC's Maastricht judgement is also based on this view, see BVerfGE 89, 155 at 184, 
190, 198 et seq.
41 As to this concept in the Community context see Murswieck, Der Staat 32 (1993), 161.
42Arichiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 1997, 570.
■^Case 26/62, ECR 1963, 1 - Van Gend & Loos.
44 U s Verts, Case 294/82, ECR 1986, 1339, 1365; confirmed in opinion 1/91, ECR 1-1991,6084, 6102.




























































































the EC has taken place by virtue of customary law since the majority of the con­
stitutional or highest courts of the MSS do not in principle exclude control over 
EC law.4® This is not only true for the German constitutional court. In France, the 
Advocate General has, in the famous Nicolo case before the Conseil d'Etat, even 
explicitly discarded the Kelsenian model of supraordination of EC law.46 7 The 
same is also true for most other European constitutional or highest courts.48 Be­
yond that, the recent evolution from the EC to the Union shows a considerable 
regression to PIL patterns of intergovernmental cooperation.49 This is particularly 
true with regard to the structure of the 2nd and 3rd pillar of the Union, which - 
despite important transfers from the third to the first pillar - has been left unaf­
fected as such by the Amsterdam Treaty. Finally, also this form of monism has to 
face the criticism that it renders impossible an equal cooperation between both 
legal orders and their courts as the only realistic form of conflict resolution.
As to the only logically remaining alternative, that is a dualistic interpretation of 
the relationship between both legal orders, it has, first of all, the advantage of 
keeping this way out of the conflict open. More importantly, however, this inter­
pretation comes closest to the reality of two legal orders, which are visibly sepa­
rated despite important interconnections and which are protected by two powerful 
courts, each of them having the last word with respect to all legal issues arising 
within each system. Pursuant to the dualistic logic, both legal orders constitute 
logically independent systems with two different Grundnonnen. As a conse­
quence, conflicts of validity between both orders are excluded by definition, 
whereas "conflicts of obligation" for individuals facing the equally justified claims 
for validity of norms emanating from the two orders are possible.
The theory of institutional legal positivsm, founded by Neil MacCormick and Ota Wein­
berger reaches the same conclusion.50 It conceives of law as a system, directed towards a 
coherent unity of norms, the existence of a legal order being regarded as a sort of 
"regulatory ideal". Since the actual enforcement of the legal order ultimately depends on 
legal institutions, founded and directed by norms, it may be qualified as an "institutional 
normative system". The interface between legal orders is regulated in each system by spe­
cific criteria of legal validity, as contained in so-called norms of recognition (Hart). An 
analysis of the interplay of the EC and national legal orders along these lines of institutional 
positivism first shows that both orders do not constitute one monistic system, in which EC 
law would be surpaordinated to national law (monism with subordination of EC law is not
46Stremz. Grundrechtsschut/. 1989. I28etseq.
47Rcprinted in EuGRZ 1990. 99.
48As to England see House of Lords in the Factortainc-casc. 3 CMLR (1990). 375 (380); for Spain see Spanish 
Constilutional Couri. Declaration D 1-7-1992. XXXIII Jurisprudcncia Constitucional 1992, 460 (472). An 
unlimited supremacy based on a hierarchical supraposilion was only advocated by the Belgian Court de Cassa­
tion in the case Le Ski (EuGRZ 1975. 308); however, the new Cour d' Arbitrage claims again a limited compe­
tence of constitutional review, see Brihosia, Applicabilité directe et primauté des traités internationaux et du 
droit communautaire. Revue Belge de Droit International. 1/1996, 33.
4SStreinz. Europarecht, 3rd ed. 1996. 35 at No. 112.




























































































even discussed). Mac Cormick states: "[The monistic picture] does not square well with the 
fact that the effective legislature for the EC is the council of Ministers, whose members are 
identifiable only by reference to the place they hold according to state-systems of law: so 
EC powers of legal change and criteria of validity presuppoe the validity of competences 
conferred by state-systems, but not themselves validated by EC law. More generally, the 
institutional theory of law insists on a degree of sociological realism, hence is not in the 
Kelsenian sense a pure theory. From this point of view, it is clear that institutions of state 
law look to the state legal order for confirmation of their competences, not treating this as 
contingent upon ulterior validation or legitimation by the EC; while reciprocally EC institu­
tions look to the foundation treaties as sufficient for their validation. A pluralistic analysis is 
in this instance, and on these grounds, clearly preferable to a monistic one.”
The dualistic interpretation qualifies the value of the concepts of "(full) auton­
omy" and "emancipation” of EC law from its base in constitutional and PIL. For, 
as we know since Triepelsi, the relationship of ordinary PIL, including interna­
tional treaties, and national law may also be conceived of as dualistic. Thereafter, 
the juxtaposition of national and international law, the latter possessing its own 
Grundnorm and thus full autonomy, would be nothing special at all. As a conse­
quence thereof, the notions of "emancipation" and "full autonomy" are not helpful 
in legal theory. What matters than is only the différenciation between dualism and 
monism, and, within the latter, between subordination and supraordination of the 
legal orders involved.
Now, from the existence of two Grundnormen, some fundamental conse­
quences concerning the reach of conflict norms ("bridging norms"), like in par­
ticular the supremacy rule, may be derived. According to the only theoretically 
possible conception, the primacy norm cannot change the dualistic structure itself 
- in other words, it cannot bring about a "legal revolution" through the annexion 
of a legal order under the Grundnorm of another. This means that the supremacy 
rule can only go as far the national Grundnorm allows it to go; i.e. EC law can 
only influence the national legal order in so far as national constitutions allow it to 
do so through their opening clauses. In the case of German law, the admissible 
degree of influence is, as shown, determined by the interpretation of Arts. 23, 79 
III in the sense of a pratical concordance balancing, taking into account the 
pecularities and needs of the EC. All in all, these provisions render possible a far- 
reaching, but not unlimited, "intrusion" of EC law into the national legal order. As 
opposed to a monistic construction with the subordination of EC law, though, the 
possible influences of national law on EC law are not unlimited either.
The institutional legal positivism advocates a similar restriction of supremacy: "(...) The le­
gal systems of MSS and their common legal system of EC law are distinct but interacting 
systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of validity, within the criteria of validity 
proper to distinct systems, do not add up to any sort of all-purpose superiority of one sys­
tem over another. It also follows that the interpretative power of the highest decision­
making authorities of the different systems must be, as to each system, ultimate (...) What




























































































For the concrete possibilités of avoiding and, if necessary, resolving conflicts, 
important basic implications may be derived from the dualistic model.5-9 First, it 
entails that there is no hierarchical sub- or supraordination between both legal 
orders. Thus, both may not try to subject each other, but have to respect their 
mutual relative autonomy. Furthermore, the ECJ must recognise that parts of its 
premises are inconsistent: As shown, supremacy ends where "Grundnorm- 
related" constitutional essentials of the MSS are stake. In such a case, a solution 
may only be found through cooperation, in which the two judiciaries have to 
agree on a constitutional standard (e.g. in human rights protection) acceptable for 
both; this will be called "concordance solution" here. Instead of a blind octroi of 
supremacy, the colliding principals have to be optimised so that each will retain a 
maximum of efficiency.* 54 It is the best solution, which can claim a maximum of 
legitimacy. As will be shown, these principles are not only a command of reason 
(which could not justify the abandonment of cogent legal premises anyway) or a 
purely theoretical deduction from the dualistic model. Rather, they can be found 
in European and national positive law as well. In the following analysis, it will be 
shown that the FCC and the ECJ have not yet exhausted the existing potential in 
order to avoid conflict.
If, however, a concordance solution along the lines just desribed were to fail, 
the legal ressources are, contrary to what is generally assumed, still not ex­
hausted. For then, if one were not to think that the conflict should be deliberately 
left open for tactical reasons, one might still try to resort to a PIL approach of 
conflict resolution, consisting of conciliation, i.e. mediation and arbitration.55 
While being primarily legal - and not political - these devices share the specific 
feature that their results are only persuasive and not necessarily binding within 
the involved legal orders. Thus, at the end of the day, a conciliation device might 
bring about (only) an intermediary solution between monism and dualism.
Moving back now to the level of positive law, the remainder of the article ex­
plores to which extent these lessons from legal theory can be realised with the 
help of the existing legal devices in both national and EC law.
IV. Conflict-avoidance capacities of national constitutional law
On the basis of the divergent perspectives of the ECJ and national constitu­
tional law, the capacities of national law are confined to procedural devices of 
conflict avoidance. First, a finding of a European act as unconstitutional must be
55For an earlier similar view see Heintzen. AoR 119 (1994), 564 (583ff.).
54See Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechie, 2nd ed„ 78 el seq.; 152.
55 These two notions are often not distinguished in the literature. Here, conciliation is used as a general term 
encompassing both mediation and arbitration. Whereas mediation, typically meaning a conciliation procedure 
by a representative of a third state, which may even have its own interest in the case, is more politically ori­
ented, arbitration consists of the conciliation by a neutral body like a commission, often composed by interna­
tional lawyers. Thus, the solution to be proposed here is closer to arbitration. However, the general term con­




























































































this indicates is that acceptance of a pluralistic conception of legal systems entails acknowl­
edging that not all legal problems can be solved legally."
4. Implications of the dualist model on a conflict resolution
The theoretical reconstruction permits a critical evaluation of the well- 
foundedness of the above-mentioned different premises of the ECJ and the Ger­
man Constitutional Court, which form the basis of the conflict. From this evalua­
tion, important implications for the resolution of constitutitonal conflicts will be 
derived, which, in a further step, will be realised with the devices available under 
positive law as it stands.
First, the reconstruction shows that the ECJ's postulate of an unlimited suprem­
acy is logically inconsistent from a dualistic or a monistic perspective with su- 
praordination of national law. The only model which would logically allow for 
such a far-reaching influence on national legal systems, monism with supraordi- 
nation of EC law, does not correspond to the legal and social reality of the Euro­
pean order. According to the dualistic model advocated here, the postulate of the 
FCC of being the ultimate umpire regarding EC law which is to be applied within 
the national legal order is, in principle, justified. As will be shown, however, this 
competence in positive law comprises first of all only the competence to examine 
constitutional incompatibilities, and not to set aside European law without taking 
any further preliminary steps. Furthermore, under a dualistic model, Mac Cor- 
mick’s conclusion that not all legal problems can be solved legally is also correct 
in principle. However, it does not mean that such conflicts can only be solved 
politically. Rather, a dualistic structure in which "conflicts of obligation" for citi­
zens emerge on a regular basis would hardly be viable. This is the clear conse­
quence of Kelsen's famous quotation from the bible, that no one can serve two 
masters.52
Instead of resorting too early to a political solution, law must first try to find an 
"intra-legal" solution. Generally, this may be achieved by trying to avoid or, if 
these efforts fail, to resolve conflicts. In this context, it should be noted that even 
the resolution of legal conflicts between several legal orders is a genuinely legal 
task. This should be particularly true for the EC since, in the face of a smaller de­
gree of political consensus, law in the EC was always more important than poli­
tics. The "intra-legal" character of the task of conflict resolution is clearly shown, 
inter alia, by the existence of a whole legal discipline devoted to the resolution of 
conflicts between different national legal orders: private international law. To sum 
up, it may be assumed that conflict resolution is a legal task and that the lack of a 
resolution mechanism brings to light a weakness of the EC system, but does not 
cast doubt on the "intralegal" qualification of such measures. This means that, in 
the EC context, all legal devices for conflict resolution have to be exhausted be­
fore a political solution may be resorted to.




























































































reserved to the FCC in an analogous application of Art. 100 Basic Law.56 This 
can be justified by the (at any rate) quasi-constitional character of the European 
Treaties and the need for legal certainty, with which a review competence of in­
stance court judges would be incompatible. Second, it must be ensured that the 
ECJ has had the opportunity to give an opinion on any relevant issue of the case 
at stake. Thus, before the finding of a European act as unconstitutional, the FCC 
is generally compelled to refer the matter to the ECJ pursuant to Art. 177 para. Ill 
TEC.57 This is so even if another national court has already referred the same 
matter to the ECJ before, but a new important legal issue has arisen in the mean­
time.
Thus, in the Banana case, if the FCC were to hold the EC Banana regime at odds with Art. 
24 GG, it would have to refer the case once again to the ECJ, since the latter has not yet 
given an opinion on the status of WTO dispute settlement resolutions in EC law, particu­
larly as to its potential direct effect.
Lastly and most importantly: The balancing of the relevant constitutional crite­
ria - the task of bringing about integration on the one hand and all other constitu­
tional principles and values including human rights and respect for the compe­
tences on the other - shows that judicial self restraint as to a general control for  
structural flaws is possible. This is exactly the approach chosen by the the FCC 
in the Solange Il-decision58 and (probably) confirmed by the reference to the 
"cooperation"59 between the ECJ and the FCC in the field of human rights pro­
tection in the Maastricht judgement. So, a more or less contingent violation of 
constitutional essentials in a single case can still be accepted. Only if the ECJ 
shows structural weaknesses60 61- e.g. the methodologically completely unsatisfying 
control of human rights in the Banana judgment67 - that are likely to produce di­
vergent results in a variety of cases, can the control be effectuated. However, as 
was the case in the Banana conflict, whenever the review under European and 
national human rights standards leads to different outcomes, a "structural flaw" 
which would require constitutional review is likely to be found. So, in the end, a
56According to Art. 100 Basic Law. any national instance court judge must suspend a pending proceeding and 
refer a national parliamentary statute for constitutional review to the Federal Constitutional Court, if he or she 
is convinced of its incompatibiity with the Basic Law and if such a finding would be relevant for the outcome of 
the case at issue (the so called "incidental control procedure" - konkrete Normenkontrolle). So, as a matter of 
fact, no instance court judge may decide on the constitutionality of a statute (as opposed to regulations and 
provisions enacted by the executive) - the Federal Constitutional Court has the monopoly of constitutional re­
view- In favour on the analogous application of Art. 100 GG, see Grimm. Recht der Arbeit 1996, 66 (70) = 3 
Columbia J. of European Law, 229.
57See Streinz, Europarecht. 3rd ed. 1996, 65 at No. 217a.
5sBVerfGE 73, 339 (374 et seq.) - Solange II.
59However, the term cooperation' is rather euphemistic in this context. More or less, it means that the FCC 
leaves the daily business of adjudication to the ECJ. but reserves itself the right to intervene on constitutional 
grounds whenever it deems necessary.
60For methodological differences in the examination of human rights violations see Nettesheim, Europaische 
Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1995, 106. and Streinz. Grundrechtsschutz, 1989. 365 et seq.




























































































certain potential for conflicts cannot be excluded de lege lata by national consti­
tutional law.62 However, as will be shown below, the actual exercise of constitu­
tional control can be smoothed out by principles borrowed from PIL.
V. A new EC and PIL approach for avoiding and resolving conflicts
EC law, as opposed to national constitutional law, not only contains strategies 
for avoiding conflicts but also more far-reaching devices to solve conflicts. Sub­
stantive and procedural instruments may be distinguished. The point of departure 
is the duty of EC institutions to respect the essentials of national constitutions (1). 
This allows for a convergence of substantive standards which will render con­
flicts less likely to become acute. If however such a converging interpretation 
should not be achieved, one faces the question of whether to simply leave con­
flicts open, thereby continuing the present Cold War scenario, or to search for a 
conciliatory solution (2). If the latter decision is taken, the conditions of ad- 
missability for gap-filling in EC law and for the recourse to PIL in particular will 
have to be examined (3). As these can also be complied with, a PIL solution will 
be expounded in detail (4) and, with the necessary adaptations, transposed to EC 
law (5). After that, the implications of this solution for EC law, PIL, national 
constitutional law and legal theory will have to be examined (6). Finally, the pos­
sible critique that this approach consists of a too far-reaching constitutional re­
form in "PIL clothes" will be countered (8). Following this line of reasoning, first 
of all, the conflict avoidance potential immanent in EC law and its procedural 
implications will be examined.
1. Chances and limits of a concordance solution
a) The solidarity duty pursuant to Arts. 5 TEC and F I TEU63 
Art. 5 TEC, included in the TEC at the request of the German delegation,64 is
62See Grimm. Recht der Arbeit 1996. 66 (71) = 3 Columbia J. of European Law, 229 (241 ct seq.); dissenting 
Hirsch, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1996. 2457. However. ECJ-judge Gunter Hirsch does not deny the 
conflict potential as such. Rather, he wants to render impossible the outburst of a conflict by propagating a 
further judicial self restraint in the sense that even the review of the standards set out in Art. 79 III Basic Law
should not be undertaken on a case to case basis, but should be confined to "structural flaws". According to 
him. Art. 79 III Basic Law would only guarantee the indispensable minimum of democratic legitimation and
legal protection. However, such a restrictive interpretation of the provision seems to be incompatible with the 
unlimited obligation of all German organs to respect the basic rights enshrined in the Grundgesetz (Art. 1 III 
Basic Law. to which Art. 79 III refers) and the role of the FCC to monitor the respect of the Grundgesetz in 
each single case (see Art. 92 Basic Law). In addition, reactivating the FCC’s task of control only in the case of 
major structural flaws would bear the risk that then, the constitutional order could already be politically- 
changed in a legally irreversible way. This, however, is exactly a mischief Art. 79 III GG has the task to avoid. 
^ I t  should be noted that such a duty might also be derived from the subsidiarity principle which might be 
viewed as broad enough to encompass the obligation for Community institutions to respect, whenever possible, 
common or specifically national constitutional values (de Witte, Legal Issues in European Integration 2 (1991), 
1 (20)). However, in the Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty mentioned above, the MS have pre-empted 
such an interpretation of the principle. Furthermore, this author believes that Arts. 5 TEC and F I TEU are the 
more appropriate sedes materiae of a cooperation and solidarity duty than the all-purpose subsidiarity principle, 




























































































continuously referred to by the ECJ as a general clause to deal with all kinds of 
legal problems arising between the EC and its MSS. Three directions followed by 
the ECJ in the concrétisation of this provision are relevant in the present context. 
The first is the deduction of genuine legal duties which have partly been put into 
highly concrete terms. Thus, the principal duty to take appropriate measures to 
ensure the fulfilment of treaty obligations and to facilitate the achievement of the 
EC's tasks is construed widely so as to include ancillary duties necessary for its 
efficient implementation.85 Second, Art. 5 TEC was relied upon in the elaboration 
of the general doctrines as to the relationship between EC and national law. So, 
as stated, recourse to this provision has been made in the elaboration deduction of 
the supremacy doctrine. Also the duty of directive-conforming interpretation (by 
some called "indirect effect")64 *6 and the European principles on state liability were 
partly based on Art. 5 TEC.67 Finally, since the middle of the 80s, the ECJ has 
extended Art. 5 TEC to include also duties o f the EC with respect to the MSS.68 
Also here, highly "concretised" duties have been developed, e.g. the Commis­
sion's duty to pass all information relevant to the application of EC law to na­
tional courts, including the production of documents requested by a national court 
and the examination of a Commission official as a witness before a national 
court.69
To counteract the fear of an omnipotent Union and a creeping "destatalisation" 
of the MSS, the duty to respect the national identities of MSS was introduced in 
Art. F I of the Maastricht Treaty.70 *The ambiguous term "national identity" does 
not mean any sort of national seclusion in the present context.77 Rather, it is to be 
construed in the sense of a respectful attitude towards the basic stmctures and 
institutions of a state, the choice of all MSS for European integration being how­
64Blanquet, L'article 5 du traité. 1994. 8: on Art. 5 TEC in general see also Mortelmans. MJ 5 (1998). 67.
85Thus, the ECJ deemed the enactment of a national budget law to be necessary, when Community law re­
quired certain financial means to be devoted to a certain scope (Case 6/73. ECR 1973. 161 - Commission vs. 
Italy) Another such ancillary obligation is the duty to recover unlawful state aid regardless of internal provi­
sions on limitation (Case C-24/95 of 20/3/1997 - Alcan). Futhermore, the ECJ even postulates that the duty of 
efficient implementation of Community law encompasses the duty of States to forsee appropriate sanctions with 
dissuasive effect: see comprehensively Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht. 1996. 303 et seq.
66Cases 14/83, 1984 ECR 1891 - von Colson, and 106/89. ECR I. 4135 - Marleasing. See Brechmann, Die 
richtlinicnkonforme Auslegung. 1994. 31 el seq.
67Cases C-6/90 und C-9/90. ECR 1991 I. 5357 - Francovich: see futhermore Cases C-46/93 und C-48/93. Slg. 
1-1996. 1029 - Brasserie du Pecheur und Factortame III, in which slate liability was extended from the incorrect 
implementation of a directive to any manifest and essential breach of EC law. See for an overall view Herde- 
gen/Rensniann, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 161 (1997), 522.
85Case 230/81. ECR 1983. 255 - Luxemburg vs. Parliament: Case 94/87 - Commission vs. Deutschland, ECR 
1989, 175. 192. Zusatzlich liiBt sich eine solche Verpflichtung der Gemeinschaft gegeniiber den Mitglied- 
staaten aus dem Grundsatz der Funktionsfâhigkeit der Gemeinschaft ableiten. vgl. Streinz. Grundrechtsschutz, 
1989, 33 et seq.
69Case 2/88, ECR 1990,1-3365 and 4405. Zwartfeld 1 and II.
70As to the genesis of this provision see Hi If. in: Gedâchtnisschrift für Grabitz, 1995. 157 (160 et seq.).




























































































ever one of these. Accordingly, it is claimed that the EC may not adopt measures 
which intrude disproportionally into the realm of MSS72 73- maxims as yet difficult 
to put into concrete terms.
The solidarity and cooperation duty in Art. 5 TEC has been legitimately viewed 
as the entrance gate of national constitutional law into EC law by academic litera­
ture even though the ECJ has never made a statement in this sense.72 However, 
the extension of this duty to national constitutions has become irrefutable by the 
expressly stipulated command to respect national identities of MSS contained in 
Art. F I TEU. For in the case of states based upon a written or unwritten legal 
constitution (which is true for all MSS of the EC), the constitutional identity,74 
comprising the main features of a constitution, must be qualified as an important 
component of the national identity.75 Even though Art. F I TEU may have been 
largely intended as symbolic legislation76 with the purpose of appeasing MSS, it 
would appear unjustifiable not to take its clear wording seriously. Thus, the duty 
must not be interpreted as a purely programmatic maxim without any legally bin­
ding value, and its scope must not be restricted to, say, cultural matters. Further­
more, it would seem untenable to exclude the protection of national constitutional 
identities from the scope of Art. 5 TEC and to determine in this sense, by appli­
cation of the ac^w/.v-safeguard clause contained in Art. M TEU, the interpretation 
of Art. F TEU as well. It is true that the ECJ has ever since confined itself to the 
elaboration of independent and uniform European constitutional standards, in 
particular in the area of human rights. However, as shown in the theoretical re­
construction above, this interpretation of the treaties is ultra vires in so far as it 
does not guarantee the respect of national constitutional essentials (as shaped by 
the competent national courts); for it goes beyond the reach of the supremacy 
doctrine under a dualistic modell. To put it differently: As opposed to the im­
portant judicial development of European constitutional standards in particular in 
human rights, the possible disrespect, by EC organs, of national constitutional 
essentials can not be recognised as a valid acquis communautaire which would 
be relevant for the interpretation of the TEC according to Art. M TEU. So, all in 
all, no argument can be made in favour of the exclusion of constitutional identity 
from the scope of Art. F I TEU. As a consequence thereof, Art M TEU may now 
be drawn upon just in the opposite direction: In order to avoid that the standard of 
protection of national identity is higher under Art. F I TEU than under Art. 5 
TEC, the latter provision must be interpreted as to include constitutional identity
72Hilf, in: Grabitz/Hilf (ed.), Kommentar zur Europaischcn Union, 1995, Art. F EUV, at No. 17.
73V. Bogdandy, in: Grabitz/Hilf (ed.), Kommentar zur Europaischcn Union Art. 5. at No. 82; Bleckmann, Eu- 
roparecht, 6th ed. 1997, 255, 71 et seq.; Streinz, Europarecht, 3rd ed. 1996, 46, at No. 142.
74See Kirchhof in: Isensee/Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Slaatsrechts I, 1987, 775 et seq.; Lerche, Eu- 
ropaische Staatlichkeit und die Identitat des Grundgesetzes, in: Festschrift fiir Redeker, 1993, XXX.
75See de Witte, Legal Issues in European Integration 2 (1991), 1 (20): "the fairly vague notion of 'national 
identity' might become legally relevant by referring to the constitutions as the depositary of national identity".




























































































as well. As a result, one may duly claim under both provisions that the EC is bo­
und to take into account constitutional problems of the MSS and to collaborate 
with them in a constructive way in order to avoid conflicts. In particular, the 
principles constituting the constitutional identity of a MS should remain un­
touchable for the Union.77
For the precise definition of the contents of its national identity, the autoportrait 
of a state must in the first place be decisive. For a hard core of societal, cultural 
and legal values and norms can only be credibly protected if a state itself may 
decide what is part of it. Thus, in conflict of laws-terms, Art. F I TEU may be 
regarded as a 'rattachement for the sake of qualification' (Qualifikationsverwei- 
sung), which calls upon national law to decide on the concrétisation of the notion 
of identity. It must be noted, however, that part of the national identity is also the 
membership in a supranational community, which, in turn, can only exist if the 
nation states accept a delimitation of their national sovereignty, including the far- 
reaching supremacy of European law over national law. As a result, Art. F I may 
duly be read as a formula of "concordance" similar to Art. 23 GG. The material 
premises of both legal orders can therefore be said to be nearly identical, which 
should greatly facilitate a "concordance solution" of conflicts.78
b) Procedural implications
Despite the substantive convergence just expounded, the procedural implemen­
tation of the identity guarantee does not seem to be easy. First, it is no problem 
that Art. F TEU is not under the jurisdiction of the ECJ (Art. L TEU) - which re­
flects the concept of the Union as an association of the MSS being designed to 
contain the supranational Communities. For the ECJ can, indirectly, give rulings 
on the scope of Art. F I TEU by integrating it into the interpretation of Art. 5 
TEC. This is even obligatory since, as shown, the constitutional identity of MS is
77This was also the perspective adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court in the Maastricht decision 
(BVerfGE 89, 155 (184). when it stated that the majority principle was limited by constitutional principles and 
fundamental interests of the Member States. In saying this, the Federal Constitutional Court seemed however to 
imply that, in these cases, the majority rule shall be suspended in favour of unanimity. It seems overstated, 
though, to base such an incisive change in the institutional structure of the Community only on Art. 5 TEC.
78In substance, this solution is comparable to the one proposed by Phelan (Revolt or Revolution: the Constitu­
tional boundaries of the EC, 1997. 417 et seq.). Thereafter, in order to prevent a dangerous revolt or revolution 
(also understood in the sense of the subordination of the national legal order under a new Grundnorm), a new 
norm should be introduced into EC law: The special type of rights embedded in national constitutions which 
are considered by the national courts to express basic principles concerning life, liberty, religion, and the fam­
ily. to have as their interpretative teleology a national vision of statehood and morality, and tc be fundamental 
to the legitimacy of the national legal order and the preservation of its concept of law take precedence over EC 
law within their field of application." This norm should be supervised by national courts, and not by the ECJ 
(op. cit.. at 417). However, apart from the fact that its adoption is politically quite improbable, this formula, 
clearly inspired by the Irish abortion case, is not exhaustive with regard to economic national constitutional 
rights like the guarantee of property or the free choice and exercise of a profession (which were found to be 
violated by the EC Banana regime). Finally, its postulation only de lege ferenda. does not account of the reach 
de lege lata of Arts. 5 TEC and F I TEU, as expounded here. On Phelan, see also MacCormick, 18 Oxford J. of 




























































































protected by Art. 5 TEC in the same way as by Art. F I TEU. which explicitly 
orders such protection. As shown, the inclusion of constitutional identity of MS is 
also possible through the construction of "multilateral extension" of Art. 5 TEC.
Now, if the wording of Art. F I TEU is to be taken seriously, the protection of 
the constitutional identity of a MS through the ECJ via Art. 5 TEC must go much 
further than in the present jurisprudence, which is exclusively concerned with the 
elaboration of uniform European constitutional standards. For an efficient protec­
tion is only possible, if the elements of national constitutions considered by the 
highest national courts as "identity-relevant" are taken into account directly by the 
ECJ. This includes national human rights, even in so far as they are different from 
European human rights as shaped by the jurisprudence of the ECJ. As a conse­
quence thereof, it seems essential that the ECJ considers national jurisprudence 
directly, and integrates it into its decisions. This does not mean that this court 
would have to respect national constitutional standards in any single case. Rather, 
according to the "concordance" approach described above, it must also consider 
the needs of the EC in this balancing procedure; thus, if it gives good reasons for 
why a certain national constitutional standard is not appropriate at EC level, the 
ECJ might of course reject it. Even though, in this way, the national constitutional 
standard would not always be fully respected, an explicit discussion of the juris­
prudence of national constitutional courts might considerably improve the coop­
eration between both judiciaries, since it would engage them in a specific prob­
lem-related discourse. This might be another means for the rationalisation and de- 
escalation of conflicts.
c) In particular: The reach o f the ECJ's jurisdictional competence
From the dualistic model, it may be deduced that the ECJ is not the ultimate 
umpire for the decision of "identity-relevant" conflicts in application o f the su­
premacy doctrine. First, one must first bear in mind that such a judicial compe­
tence was not provided for at all by the treaties; under Art. 177 TEC, the ECJ 
was only given the task to guarantee the uniform application of EC law. With the 
elaboration of the supremacy doctrine, though, the ECJ automatically received the 
competence to enforce it and, thus, to decide conflicts with internal law. This task 
was taken over by the ECJ with the tacit approval of the MSS, and may probably 
be qualified as customary law in the meantime. However, in the case of "identity­
relevant" conflicts, the ECJ's competence cannot be exhaustive. For just as, in a 
dualistic system, the supremacy rule must be limited, and cannot bring about the 
annexion of a legal order under the Grundnorm of another, the competence of the 
guardian of the supremacy rule, the ECJ, must also be limited. Thus, by virtue of 
the supremacy doctrine, this court has no competence to sit as the ultimate umpire 
over "identity-relevant” conflicts.
However, this is not the whole story. According to the principle of pratical con­
cordance read into Arts. 5 TEC and F I TEU, a mediation between national and 




























































































task of the ECJ. Correspondingly, the scope of the ECJ's judicial competence 
flowing from this mediation task must be determined. First of all, it is clear that, 
in order to comply with this task, the ECJ would have to abandon its role as the 
motor of integration and the guardian of the treaties at least in "identity-relevant" 
cases. Rather, it would have to act as a true Cour d'Arbitrage, in other words as a 
genuine constitutional court, being placed over both the Communities and the 
MSS. As stated, this would mean that the ECJ takes into account explicitly the 
national constitution involved and its concrétisation through the competent natio­
nal constitutional court.
A duty to take into account all national constitutions of MSS would apply to judicial la­
wmaking. There, the ECJ could not act as a conciliation body whenever national courts re­
gard a "judicial construction" e.g. on state liability as unconstitutional. For in this case, the 
ECJ would clearly act as a judge in its own cause, which is inadmissible pursuant to a uni­
versal legal principle.79
If the ECJ were really willing to act as a conciliation body along these lines 
(which does not seem probable at the present stage), it would at least be illoyal 
for a MS to deny authority to a ECJ conciliation decision by drawing on the dua- 
listic model and the limited reach of supremacy. Rather, it would be entirely up to 
the MS in question to show why its constitutional identity is not sufficiently pro­
tected even though the ECJ has explicitly taken it into account in its decision. 
However, if a MS constitutional court were really able to give good reasons for 
an ongoing massive lack of protection (for which, in the absence of a competent 
organ to decide on this question, a not manifestly unfounded bona fides declarati­
on must be enough), the jurisdiction of the ECJ has reached its limits. For as 
shown, under a dualistic model, the ECJ must be regarded as a part of the EC le­
gal order, and cannot be qualified as a third and higher institution with the compe­
tence to decide constitutional conflicts as the last umpire. In other words, the task 
of a Community organ of conciliating conflicts may not be equated with a moni­
stic subordination of the national legal order.
To sum up: As long as the ECJ refuses to act as a conciliation body and to 
protect national constitutional identities or such protection is clearly inadequate in 
the eyes of the competent national constitutional court, there exists a serious gap 
in the EC system with respect to the procedural implementation of Arts. 5 TEC 
and F I TEU. In the remainder of this article, it will be analysed whether and how 
this gap might be filled.
2. After the failure of a concordance solution
Now that is has been ascertained that the ECJ is not competent to decide 
"identity" conflicts as the last umpire, one has to make a choice between the al­
ternatives of deliberately leaving the conflict open for tactical reasons, or of de­
veloping a conciliation solution which could only be found outside EC law.




























































































The option of deliberately leaving the conflict open may at first glance be a sur­
prise, but it might well be justifiable in the EC context. With respect to the lack of 
political consensus, the viability of the EC depends to a large extent on the good 
and efficient functioning of the European judiciary. With the establishment of a 
conciliation procedure the latter’s position might be considerably weakened. It is 
clear that once the procedure is established, it would also be used by the MSS in 
order to achieve a more efficient protection of their constitutions, and the threat to 
use it would probably always be present even in Council deliberations. By con­
trast, in the current Cold War situation, the ECJ's position is more stable by virtue 
of the rationale of dissuasion, that setting aside a EC act would constitute a dan­
gerous first blow, capable of destroying the EC. Therefore, a conciliation solution 
would have a big impact on the balance of institutional powers in the EC. With 
respect to that alternative, one might conceive of the present (albeit wrong) claim 
to unlimited supremacy, and the continuation of the Cold War between the courts 
as the smaller evil.
However, these reservations are plausible only at first sight. For an higly inte­
grated community aiming at an ever closer union of its MS, a Cold War style re­
lationship between the highest courts on both sides is unacceptable in the long 
run. Not only does it seem to poison even the personal atmosphere between the 
judges,80 it is not even definitively able to allay a dangerous first blow by a na­
tional court setting aside a EC act. Up to now, the dissuasion scenario has only 
worked as an expedient. Beyond that, it is very unfortunate for the political and 
legal stability of the EC if even issues of minor economic concern like the Banana 
conflict, are capable of destroying its legal unity and, thus, of endangering the 
European peace order in the last instance. What seems to be needed is another 
forum in which conflicts which could not have been avoided through a concor­
dance solution by the two judiciaries can be conciliated.
Whereas the German constitutional court, which is usually considered the most dangerous 
rival of the ECJ, seems to be perfectly aware of the stakes of legal unity in Europe (which 
is clearly shown by its "bark, but do not bite" strategy), the danger of a first blow would 
seems to be particularly high after the Eastern enlargement of the EC. Firstly, the legal or­
ders of the East European candidates for membership are far less stable and show a lesser 
substantive convergence with respect to the further developed West European legal orders, 
which renders conflicts more likely and decreases the chances of a concordance solution. 
Beyond that, East European States seem primarily attracted by the economic wealth of 
West Europe, whereas they seem to be less aware of the geopolitical necessity of limiting 
one's own - only recently recouped (!) - sovereignty in favour of a supranational commu­
nity, a conviction which most West European States seem to share. Under these conditions, 
it may seem quite plausible that a new or recently strengthened East European Constitu­
tional Court will prove an overzealous pupil of the West European Constitutional Courts 
by actually setting aside, along the doctrinal lines developed by them in detail, a EC act as 
being fundamentally incompatible with its own economic interest, for example in agricul­
ture or mining.




























































































From the perspective of democratic theory, one might also approve the inter­
vention of a third conciliation instance. However, right at the outset, the caveat 
must be expressed here that the question of whether, and how, a functioning de­
mocracy may be realised at EC level is one of the classical subjects of contempo- 
ral legal and political science research that can only be vaguely touched upon in 
the present context.
In the first place, it must be conceded that, in the European multi-level governance system, 
there is no traditional demos, and the ordinary conditions for its realisation (particularly in­
termediary structures like European parties, associations, citizens' mouvernents and com­
munication media) are largely absent. As a consequence, a traditional input-oriented, i.e. 
identification-based democracy, in which even massive redistributory measures were ac­
ceptable, is hardly realisable. Since, however, the problem-solving capacities of the nation 
states are no longer sufficient, there is no alternative to the further development of efficient 
supranational structures. This also means that efficient alternative concepts for the realisa­
tions of democratic conditions should be developed. These should not be purely output- 
oriented, i.e. result-dependent concepts, but also alternative input-concepts. Among them, 
the concept of deliberative supranationalism, which does not presuppose a largely uniform 
European demos, is probably the most prominent one. Its principal aim consists of estab­
lishing the conditions for "external and taming deliberative political processes between in­
stitutional actors and soc ie ties" ,in  which the best political solutions win the race because 
of their rational superiority. Under this perspective, even the competence of national consti­
tutional courts to examine the constitutional compatability of European acts (as opposed to 
the competence of setting aside such acts) seems useful, since it can initiate a fertile inter- 
institutional process of deliberation. A final decision by a third instance triggered by na­
tional constitutional courts might also seem desirable in order to maintain a useful institu­
tional balance of power between the EC and its MSS, and to counteract a bureaucratic 
"autodynamic" without sufficient democratic control.8 2
With regard to the present situation of Cold War between the courts, it is quite obvious that the community 
practice of forcing obeyance under the sword of Damocles - that is. a collapse of legal unity - with respect 
to democratically weakly legitimated majority decisions of the Council of Ministers, is incompatible with 
the concept of deliberative supranationalism. Rather, it must be ensured that a discourse which has failed at 
one level can be continued at another. Here, a statement by Rawls deploys its full strength: "(...) The point 
of legal institutions is to set up a framework that facilitates and enhances the public use o f reason: a 
structure o f discussion which must not he deformed either through external or internal coercion and which 
allows the continuing o f public discourse when shared understandings o f lesser generality have broken 
down." With respect to these provisos, a conciliation decision by a body composed of EC and MS represen­
tatives like national constitutional court and ECJ judges assembled in a sort a "common senate" would 
seem ideal. Such a body would probably give the EC even greater legal coherence than the ECJ now.
To sum up, the deliberate leaving open of the conflict, as practised up to now, 
does not seem to be the best option. Rather, all possibilities of achieving a proce­
dural solution by establishing a third body as the ultimate umpire should be ex­
hausted. Of course, it is in the first place a task of the European legislator to set 
up such a body and to regulate its procedure. In this context, it should be noted 
that one such proposal has already been developed by two eminent authors in
8IJoerf>es. European Challenges to Private Law. European L. i. 3 (1997). 377 (3S9).




























































































academic literature; In two recent articles,85 Joseph H. H. Weiler and Ulrich R. 
Haltern have proposed the establishment of a European Constitutional Council 
after the French model, which should primarily be competent to perform an ex 
ante control over competence issues, including questions of subsidiarity.*•' Unfor­
tunately, at the Amsterdam summit, this extremely interesting proposal was ap­
parently not even discussed. However, as will be shown in the next sections of 
this article, even without any action by the European legislator, such a concilia­
tion procedure is already obligatory under standing law: PIL, whose signifi­
cance for EC law is sometimes underestimated, contains principles on the rele­
vance of violations of internal law by an international treaty and on an obligatory 
conciliation mechanism which may be resorted to for the sake of conflict resolu­
tion.
3. Conditions for gap-filling through PIL
a) General conditions for and methods o f gap-filling in EC law
Whether the concrétisation of a general clause is to be qualified as interpreta­
tion or rather as gap-filling is a rather academic question.85 At any rate, recourse 
must be made to the acknowledged techniques of gap-filling, such as reasoning 
by analogy and the elaboration of general principles of law, if the wording of a 83
83Weiler/Haltern, 37 Harvard Int. L. J. (1996). 411 (446); Weiler/Haltern/Mayer, W.Eur.Politics, July 1995. 4 
(3 et seq.).
^ I t  is certainly true that this proposal contains an excellent political idea at the right moment and that a Euro­
pean Constitutional Council could easily act as a conciliation mechanism. However, the specific shape given to 
that body by Weiler and Haltern also entails serious problems. First, the limitation that the body should only 
decide on conflicts about competence is hardly justifiable; most probably, it would also generate problems of 
delimitation as to what falls under the term competence' in this sense (for example, should it also include the 
violation of human rights enshrined in a national constitution, since no state representative has the competence 
to enter into a Treaty in violation of such provisions?). More generally, if the body were to decide only accord­
ing to Community law standards, its conciliation function would hardly be credible; rather is should be seen to 
that that body is explicitly mandated to take into account national constitutions and the shape given to them by 
national constitutional courts. Next, even though an ex ante control after the model of the French Constitu­
tional Council would clearly be more efficient than an ex post control, there is apparently a huge problem of 
coordination with the ECJ’s jurisdiction. More precisely: Should an action before the ECJ against say. a Euro­
pean regulation under Art. 173 TEC, be excluded if an ex ante control by the constitutional council has already 
been exercised? Following the French example, yes. But how about an action based also on grounds different 
from competences? Finally, the establishment of an influential Constitutional Council with the powerful compe­
tence of ex ante review would intrude profoundly into the institutional balance in the Community. Thus, a 
Council dominated by national Euro-sceptics could cause much damage to the goals of integration. All in all. a 
more modest solution like the one to be developed here which foresees the decision by a conciliation body only 
as a last resort, thus causing only a smaller change to the institutional balance in the Community, might seem 
preferable. However, all these objections concern technical pecularities, and not the substance of the proposal. 
In addition, it must be conceded that even a conflict resolution mechanism like a European Constitutional 
Council would of course pre-empt the public international law solution to be proposed here.
^Since the "maximal meaning" of the wording - which is considered as the line of delimitation between inter­
pretation and gap filling - is not transgressed, and since the lack of a further regulation cannot be explained as 
an involontary and unconceptual omission of the legislator, this method can formally still be qualified as inter­
pretation. See Canaris. Die Feststellung von Liickcn im Gesetz, 2nd cd. 1982. 26 et seq.; Bxdlinski. Juristischc 




























































































provision is not sufficiently clear to allow for its application in the circumstances 
of the case at issue. However, for the concrétisation of a general clause in consti­
tutional law, which requires a multi-faceted process in the borderland of law and 
politics, these techniques are only capable of providing a starting point.®6
Bearing in mind this caveat, one has to start with the general conditions for gap­
filling in EC law. First, the question to be dealt with by the techniques of gap- 
filling must be one of law as opposed to politics, diplomacy or simply power. As 
to constitutional conflicts, it has already been stated that this is exactly the prem­
ise on which this contribution is based. Next, the question to be dealt with must 
fall within EC competences. Since the EC does not dispose of universal powers, 
gap-filling by judicial law-making may only take place in the case of an "internal 
gap",®7 i.e. if the area at stake does not fall within the competence of MSS law. 
This requirement applies also to gap-filling by PIL. For, regardless of whether 
PIL may be applied internally within a state, it is at any rate superseded by na­
tional law at that level. In the case of constitutional conflicts, this requirement 
does not create any problem, however. The resolution of such conflicts may be 
regarded as an integral part of the European-national conflict of laws-area, which 
has already been developed by the famous doctrines of the ECJ named above and 
which can reasonably only be dealt with by EC law, since a uniform solution 
available for all MSS needs to be found.
Moving now to the methods of gap filling, it is clear that, for the lack of legal 
"material" in European primary law, recourse to analogy or to general principles 
of EC law is useless. The same is true for common constitutional principles of the 
MSS, since the absolute majority of them do not have federal systems: beyond 
that, one would however have to take into account that, with respect to its struc­
tural supranational pecularities, the EC could not be equated to one of the few 
European federal states either. Therefore, the only remaining possibility lies in the 
fertilisation of PIL principles.
b) Foundations o f gap-filling through PIL-principles
Since the last century, the problem of the relevance of violations of internal law 
through the conclusion of a treaty has been discussed in PIL. A solution to the *
®«As to the concrétisation of constitutions see Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 20th ed. 1995, 24 et seq.- The reference to judicial law-making, which is implicit in general 
clauses, is paraphrased by Teubner, Standards und Direktiven in Generalklauseln, 1971, 106 et seq., as their 
delegatory function (Delegationsfunktion). For the present context, the two other functions of reception and 
transformation descibed by this author, deserve attention as well (Rezeptions-  und Transfornmtionsfunktion 
(ibid., 65 et seq. und 99 et seq.)) Thereafter, social norms and values are transformed into law. Thus, general 
clauses can be viewed as "legal entrance points" for social changes. Moving to Community law, one may claim 
that general clauses like Art. 5 TEC also serve as "legal entrance points" for polical changes and shifts in the
institutional balance between the Community and its Member States. It is obvious, however, that, as opposed to 
private law, a judicial response to such changes has to take into consideration the limitations of judicial compe­
tences vis à vis the Community's political organs.
s7For this concept see C. Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von Einheitlichem UN-Kaufrecht und nationalem Recht,




























































































problem was codified in Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
of 23/5/1969 (here referred to as Vienna Convention). Thereafter, only the breach 
of "internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties" can be invoked under 
certain conditions against a PIL treaty. Before the application of this disposition 
can be discussed here, however, it has to be ascertained whether PIL can be ap­
plied at all within the EC (aa) and, if yes, which methodological resources exist to 
do so. Besides the direct application of PIL, its indirect application through the 
elaboration of general principles of EC law is to be taken into consideration (bb).
aa) Direct applicability o f general PIL in the intra-communitarian legal
sphere
Despite the remaining link of the EC treaties to their PIL base, the application 
of PIL in the intra-communitarian legal sphere is problematic, because, through 
the constitutionalisation process, the EC has undoubtedly detached itself from a 
classic international organisation. In particular, PIL might not be suited to deal 
with the specific needs of supranationalism.88
However, before entering this discussion, it should be ascertained whether the 
latest evolution of the EC, the establishment of the European Union, has not 
brought about a fall-back on the PIL regime for the whole EC system. For, as 
stated, the Union is rather a typical PIL creation, through which the MS wanted 
to strengthen the control over the supranational communites and counteract su­
pranational "autodynamics". Nevertheless, such a far-reaching intrusion into the 
structures of the EC can not be based on the general provisions of the TEU alone 
(Arts. A-F and L-S). Again, Art. M TEU, whereafter the establishment of the 
Union is without prejudice to the EC acquis, does not allow for this result since 
the supranational pecularities constitute an essential element of the acquis. 
Therefore, even after the foundation of the Union, the application of PIL in the 
intracommunitarian legal sphere can only be allowed if, and in so far as it is com­
patible with the structural features of the EC.
In this respect, some authors have completely discarded the application of PIL 
in the intra-communitarian legal sphere:89 The EC should be conceived of as an 
autonomous "self contained regime".90 PIL is only a law for "international emer­
gency situations", incapable of dealing with the ongoing processes of integration. 
The underlying logic is different: Whereas PIL promotes coordination and coop­
eration among sovereign nations, EC law aims at solidarity and integration. With 
regard to this fundamental incompatibility, general provisions of the law of trea­
ties, esp. on violation, withdrawal, termination and suspension, would not be ap­
88See for instance Breitenmoser, Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Rccht und Volkerrecht 1995, 951 
(977 et seq.).
89Schwarze, Europarecht 1983, 1; Beutler/Bieber/Pipkorn/Streil, Die Europaische Union. 4th ed. 1993, 240; 
Everting, Festschrift fur Mosler, 1983, 173, 181 et seq.
90For this concept, see Simma's article in the Netherlands Yearbook oflnternational Law 16 (1985), 111, which 




























































































propriate in the context of the EC. In short: PIL would be a Trojan horse' in EC 
law which might endanger the integration process. As a legal "forward defence", 
recourse to it should therefore be completely excluded.
However, this solution goes too far.91 First, there does not seem to be any fun­
damental discrepancy between the goals of "cooperation" and "integration". To 
realise the effet utile of EC law, it is sufficient to exclude the application of PIL 
where there is an actual conflict, an actual incompatibility with the EC's aims. In 
normal circumstances, it is indeed true that a recourse to PIL is not necessary, 
since EC law is able itself to deal with all the problems arising in the EC. But un­
der exceptional circumstances - especially regarding the interpretation of ambi­
guities or in gap-filling - PIL may provide a vast reservoir of provisions possibly 
capable of supplementing EC law. Because of the capitulation of EC law before 
constitutional conflicts, there is indeed an emergency situation where PIL could 
prove to be a life jacket rather than a Trojan horse for the EC. At any rate, it 
seems obvious that even the application of public international rules which pos­
sibly do not suit completely the particular character of the EC might still be better 
than leaving the legal conflict to an extra-legal Cold War scenario. To keep to the 
metaphor: Discarding completely the application of PIL as a "forward defence" 
could exceptionally hit the EC's own avant-guarde here.
It should be noted that the exceptional application of PIL in the present case does not 
mean, however, that the EC is to be viewed as a classic international organisation in the 
PIL style. Rather, it responds to the legal duty of any state, be it a member of an integration 
community or not, to resolve international conflicts with PIL mechanisms, if other prior­
ranking solutions have failed (see Art. 2 Nr. 2, 33 UN-Charter). For conflicts resulting 
from international treaties, the PIL minimum standard is represented by general treaty law 
as codified in the Vienna Convention. However, as already stated, in the course of the ap­
plication of any PIL norm, it has to be verified that that norm is not in conflict with the 
specific structural features of the EC - in particular, it has to be guaranteed that the with­
drawal of a MS from the EC is generally unavailable as a remedy.
Now that the applicability of PIL as an emergency regime in the intracommuni­
tarian legal sphere has been ascertained, a virtue should be made out o f this ne­
cessity. In other words, PIL should be applied and, if necessary, adapted so as 
to ensure that it constitutes an adequate and useful supplement to the EC system.
bb) EC-conforming concrétisation and adaption o f PIL
The "compatibility analysis" just mentioned may show the need for PIL norms 
to be concretised, supplemented or adapted in order to meet the specific needs of 
the EC. This is methodologically possible through judicial - or preparing that - 
exegetic law-making, i.e. by shaping general principles of EC law, using the PIL 
provisions as a model and a frame of reference. As we have seen, the ECJ has
91Blecknmnn, Europarechl, 6lh ed. 1997, 231, at No. 624 et scq.; Oppermaim. Europarecht, 1991, 190 et seq. 
at No. 506 et seq.; Slreinz, Grundrechtsschutz, 1989, 107 et seq., 313 el seq.; Simma. Netherlands Yearbook of 




























































































had recourse to general principles when formulating European human rights on 
the basis of national constitutional rights. At this stage, PIL norms are no longer a 
direct source of EC law, but they are used as a sort of 'legal quarry' to shape new 
EC law. Like the "general principles of law recognised by all civilised nations" in 
the sense of Art. 38 1 (c) of the statute of the International Court of Justice, they 
become mere "law-making sources".92 In the present context, it is important to 
note that PIL has also been used as a "law-finding" source for the elaboration of 
EC law by the ECJ.93
In this procedure, PIL provisions must be put into the context of the specific 
features of the EC - a Community unlimited in time, based on the rule of law (its 
law being directly applicable and generally taking precedence over MS law) as 
well as on democratic principles, and aiming at an ever closer integration. Thus, 
norms suiting the needs of the EC can be developed by concretising, completing 
and adapting the PIL model. Therefore, this procedure may be termed 'EC- 
conforming concrétisation and adaptation of PIL'9-'. It does not consist in pure le­
gal inventions, but in a referential method of judicial law-making which comes 
close to analogy.95 Compared to the "inductive filtering" of common features of 
norms and principles96 which is used to formulate normal "general principles" of 
law, this method is a "minus” (and therefore, it must also be allowed as well), 
since input and output-provisions share more or less the same level of abstrac­
tion.97
92As to the distinction between 'legal source’ and 'law-finding source' see Esser's classic, Grundsatz und Norm 
in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts, 4th ed. 1990, 134. For these methodological aspects compare 
in the European context the comprehensive monography by Hojfmann-Becking, Normaufbau und Mcthode, 
1973, 33 et seq.
^Summary in Schwarze, Europarecht 1983, 1 (10 et seq.).
94With this concept, I have in mind another parallel to concept used in Private International Law concept (see 
Looschelders, Die Anpassung im In ternational Privatrecht, 1995) and in International Uniform Law (see C. 
Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von Einheitlichem UN-Kaufrecht und nationalem Recht, 1996, 11 et seq.): Both 
concepts include the modification of substantive norms in order to solve logical or telelogical conflicts. 
Whereas in Private International Law, such conflicts result from divergences between two different statutes to 
be applied concurrently in a specific case (e.g. the law of successions of State A vs. familiy law of State B), they 
result from tensions between general Public International Law and the specific features of the EC as an inte­
gration community.
95Hojfmann-Becking, Normaufbau und Methode, 1973, 359.
56In German literature, this method is referred to as 'analogy of law' (Rechtsanalogie) by Bydlinski, Juristische 
Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, 2nd ed. 1991, 478 et seq., or - more precisely - as 'legal induction' 
(Induktion) by Canaris, Die Feststellung von Liicken im Gesetz, 2nd ed. 1982, 90 et seq.
57Thus, in a strict sense, the term 'general principles of law' is not exact here, at least in the German sense of 
the words: First, input and output provision may be quite concrete and detailed, hence not necessarily general. 
Secondly, if one presupposes the division between rules and principles along the line of the degree of abstrac­
tion and direct applicability in a case, the output may also be rules, and not principles. See generally for the fact 
that a sufficiently precise "legal input material" can lead to concrete and detailled outputs, Kropholler, Interna­




























































































cc) A combined approach in the present case
The two different approaches may be combined in the present case in the fol­
lowing way: As long as the outcome fits the structural pecularities of the EC, PIL 
may be applied directly. In so far as this is not case, it is necessary to effect a 
concrétisation and adaption of the relevant rules through the formation of general 
principles in conformity with the specific features of the EC. Thus, whereas in the 
first case, the EC regime is supplemented by pure PIL, genuine EC law is "newly 
forged" in the second. However, since the sole application of PIL in the intra­
communitarian sphere must already be justified by reference to the same princi­
ples which form the basis of judicial law-making, there is no clearly discernable 
line of division between both approaches.
4. Details of PIL conflict resolution
The consequences of a violation of internal law by an international treaty is a 
classic issue within PIL, which has been discussed in legal practice and literature 
for more then a century.98 Three main solutions have been proposed.99 *First, there 
was the "theory of relevance", arguing that violations, especially violations of in­
ternal law relating to the treaty making power of the organs negotiating the treaty 
(i.e. e.g. parliament vs. government), should generally be relevant at the PIL level 
and would give the State in question a right to withdraw from the convention. The 
arguments made in favour of this solution were: respect for internal democracy 
and separation of powers (particularly, the executive should be unable to circum­
vent the legislature); the need for a correct internal implementation of the treaty 
(which would be impossible if the treaty were to violate fundamental norms of 
internal law); analogies with the law of agency (according to which the principal 
can invoke lack of or abuse of power by the agent against a third party in certain 
situations'00). For the opposite conclusion, namely the irrelevance in PIL of viola­
tions of internal law, the following points were made: international legal certainty, 
the duty of a state to examine potential conflicts with internal law before entering 
into an international contract and the absence of an obligation of a party to a con­
tract to verify whether the other parties respect their own internal laws by con­
cluding the contract. As may be expected, a compromise solution between the
"F o r the literature of the past three decades see Geek. Die volkerrechtlichen Wirkungcn verfassungswidriger 
Vertrage, 1963; Cahier. Rivista Generale di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico 54 (1971), 226; Wildluiher, Treaty- 
Making Power and Constitution. 1971. chapt. 6. 14 et scq.; Mailer. Vertrauensschutz im Vòlkerrechl. 1971. 19 
et seq.; Blumenwitz. Dcr Schütz innerstuatlichcr Rechtsgemeinschalten beim AbschluB vòlkerrechtlicher Ver­
trage, 1972, 27 et scq.; tìleckniann. Grundgesetz und Vòlkerrecht. 1975. 29; Ress/Schreuer, Berichte der Deut- 
schcn Gesellschaft tur Vòlkerrecht 23 (1982), 7; Verdross/Simma. Universelles Vòlkerrecht, 3rd ed. 1984, § 68 
et seq., 44 et seq.; Cronauer. Der internationale Vertrag ini Spannungsfeld zwischen Verfassung und Vòlker­
recht, 1986, 21 et seq.; JenningsAVatts (eds.). Oppenheim's International Law, 9. Aulì. 1992, Vol. I. peace. 8 et 
scq.
" A s  to the following points, sec the summary in Wildliaher, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution, 1971. 175 
et seq.




























































































two to conciliate the needs of legal certainty and the respect for internal law and 
democracy was finally proposed: the so called "theory of evidence".101 Thereaf­
ter, the withdrawal from a treaty should only be possible if the other party has, or, 
according to normal standards of good faith, should have, noted the violation of 
essential internal law. Furthermore, it was contested whether the kind of internal 
law capable of being invoked should be limited to the competences of the organ 
concluding the treaty or not.
In 1969, the "theory of evidence” was codified in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties102 103(abridged VC). The general rule is contained in Art. 27 VC:
"A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46."
Art. 46 is phrased as follows:
"Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been ex­
pressed in violation of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invali­
dating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law 
of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in 
the matter in accordance with normal pratices and in good faith."
However, in the latter article, the dispute just mentioned (concerning which 
provisions of internal law should be integrated into the formula) was not resolved. 
First, "internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties" could refer only to 
provisions delimiting the "organic" competence of various institutions of the state 
(e.g. the powers of a government representative). Then, indirectly, the treaty­
making power, and thus also the competence of the organ representing the state, 
is limited by all internal law, especially constitutional provisions on human rights 
etc. As stated above, in the Federal Republic of Germany, organs entering into an 
international treaty or participating in EC decision making processes must espe­
cially respect the hard core of the constitution as enshrined in Art. 79 III Basic 
Law. The genesis of the Art. 46 VC shows that the latter option was apparently 
chosen, albeit no definitive answer seems to be possible.J0° Thus, the commentary 
on Art. 43 of the 1966 draft convention (Art. 46 in the final 1969 version) ex­
101 Sec Verdross/Simma. Universelles Volkerrecht. 3rd ed. 1984. 444, § 690 m.w.N.
,02Official Records. UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/1 l/Add. 2, New York 1971, 287. Tex! and travaux préparatoires are 
well documented in Wetzel/Rauschning, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1978.
103See J. P. Muller, Vertrauensschutz im Volkerrecht, 1971, 19 et seq., 207. According to Art. 32 of the same 
convention, recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion may only be had if an interpretation based on the wording, the object and 
the purpose of the treaty leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly ab­
surd of unreasonable. Since this disposition only codifies standing customary law. it may certainly applied to 
the rest of the convention as well. Here, however, the preparatory work helps to clarify the purpose of the pro­





























































































"Constitutional limitations affecting the exercice of the treaty-making power take various 
forms. Some constitutions seek to preclude the executive from entering into treaties, or 
particular kinds of treaties, except with the previous consent of a legislative organ; some 
provide that treaties shall not be effective as law within the State unless "approved" or 
confirmed in some manner by a legislative organ: others contain fundamental laws which 
are not susceptible o f alteration except by a special procedure o f constitutional amend­
ment and which in that way indirectly impose restrictions upon the power o f the executive 
to conclude treaties... The question which arises under this article is how fa r  any o f these 
constitutional limitations may affect the validity unter international law o f a consent to a 
treaty given by a State agent ostensibly authorized to declare that consent..."
This result had already been advocated by special reporter Sir Humphrey Wal- 
dock105 *. However, the International Law Commissions deliberations on the 1966 
draft seem to show that a majority of the commission members was again the in­
tegration of substantive provisions in order to safeguard legal certainty at the in­
ternational level.'06 According to their view, only few and narrowly defined ex­
ceptions to the principles of irrevelance were to be admitted. This perception is 
still relied upon by several commentators.'07
However, this view seems not only to ignore the Official Comment quoted abo­
ve, but also not to account for the changes the 1966 draft underwent with respect 
to the 1969 final version. Thereafter, following fruitless negotiations in the after- 
math of the allegation of the breach of essential internal law, a State no longer 
had the possibility of simply discarding the application of the relevant treaty pro­
vision. Rather, it was only given the right to a conciliation procedure in front of 
the United Nations (Art. 66 b VC) resp. the International Court of Justice (Art. 66 
a VC). By the introduction of these procedures, still missing in the 1966 draft, 
dangers for legal certainty were considerably diminished. Thus, an important ra­
tionale for excluding substantive provisions can no longer be relied upon.
Moreover, a teleologic interpretation also confirms this result. As Alfred Ver- 
dross and Bruno Simma have pointed out, the need to integrate substantive pro­
visions is all the the greater since these provisions are not protected in any other 
way at the P1L level.'08 Rudolf Streinz rightly emphasises that especially the 
manifest violation of substantive provisions like human rights, fundamental to the
' w See ILC-Yearbook 1966II, 240.
' 05ILC-Yearbook 1965 II, 71: "The Commission was fully aware [in the 1963 draft. C.S.] that constitutional 
restrictions upon the competence of the executive to conclude treaties are not limited to procedural provisions 
regarding the exercise of treaty-making power but may also result from provisions of substantive law en­
trenched in the constitution...".
,06Sce ILC-Yearbook 1966 I, 124 et seq.; comment by Wildhaber. Treaty-Making Power and Constitution.
1971, 348; for a summary of the preparatory work see Geek, Zeitschrift für auslandisches offentliches Recht 
und Vôlkerrecht 27 (1967), 429. at 437.
/07See the references in Verdross/Simma. Universelles Vôlkerrecht, 3rd ed. 1984, 445, Fn. 19. 




























































































good functioning of a state, would lead to unacceptable tensions with PIL.'00 
Philippe Cahier stresses that, in the Vienna Convention, there is no apparent 
reason for the different treatment of formal and substantive provisions having an 
impact on a state's treaty making power."0 Finally, Jorg P. Mueller argues that 
the integration of substantive provisions has a meaningful parallel in the increa­
sing importance of ius cogens and human rights in PIL, which is also reflected in 
the express reference to human rights in the Vienna Convention preamble."1
To these well-founded arguments, one may add that PIL has to account for the 
functional changes of international structures and law,"- particularly the genesis 
of strong regional alliances and communities. In this context, the "idyllic" classi­
cal constellation underlying Art. 46 VC, i.e. the danger that heads of state may 
enter into a binding international treaty without consulting parliament etc., while 
being by no means obsolete, may have lost some importance. Rather, conflicts 
over the delimitation of competences and a common standard of substantive valu­
es like human rights increasingly arise. Now, it is exactly in these situations that 
PIL must offer procedural devices for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Accor­
ding to the generally acknowledged methodological principle that long standing 
norms have to be adapted to changed social circumstance, and that, then, they 
may acquire a meaning different from the one their drafters had in mind, these 
changes in international structures, and also the institutional needs arising thereof, 
should be taken into account in the interpretation of Art. 46 VC."° Thereafter, 
what is important in Art. 46 is not only its substantive side, the rebuttable 
presumption of the relevance, in PIL, of manifest breaches of internal law. 
Equally important is its procedural side, the compulsory dispute settlement 
procedure, only at the end of which a definite decision as to the respect of inter­
nal law on the PIL level is taken. Taking all the above arguments together, the 
conclusion may be drawn that substantive norms should be integrated into Art. 46 
VC.
Finally, Art. 46 VC is unanimously considered by the literature to be codified 
customary law.1"  Such a qualification has already been explicitly stated by the 09*14
I09Slreinz, Grundrechtsschutz, 1989, 32 et seq.
I,0Cahier, Rivista Generale di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico 54 (1971), 226 (244 et scq).
111J. P. Mailer, Vertrauensschutz im Volkcrrecht, 1971,20 et seq.
" 2See Verdross/Simma, Universelles Volkcrrecht. 3rd ed. 1984, §§ 52-59, 4lff;
""This perspective is also present in the opinion of Luzius Wildlmber. Whereas the integration of substantive 
provisions into Art. 46 VC is generally discarded by him, he wants to revise this assessment if international 
treaties should increasingly become a danger for national constitutions in the future (Treaty-Making Power and 
Constitution, 1971, 349). Obviously, this state of affairs has already been reached within the Community law 
"subsystem".
II4Cahier, Rivista Generale di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico 54 (1971), 226. 244; Streinz. Grundrecht­





























































































International Court of Justice for other provisions of the Vienna Convention,115 
and it may even be correct for most of its provisions.116 178Moreover, with the long 
and uncontested standing of the Convention, even provisions resorting from com­
promise at the drafting stage can be regarded in the meantime as having acquired 
customary status."7 With regard to the evolution from the theories of relevance 
and irrelevance to the compromise formulated in the theory of evidence, a custo­
mary law "cristallisation" will probably have already been approved at the time of 
entry into force of the Vienna Convention. Finally, taking into account the inter­
pretation of Art. 46 VC just expounded and the long and uncontested standing of 
this norm, substantive provisions may today at least be integrated into the custo­
mary law version of the theory of evidence.
As to the procedural consequences of a state's allegation of a manifest breach of 
internal law, the Vienna Convention foresees the following devices: First of all, 
the state has to notify the violation and the intended measures to all the other 
MSS (Art. 65 I VC)."9 Notification can also be made in answer to another party 
claiming performance of the treaty or alleging its violation (Art. 65 VC) if the 
state in question, after becoming aware of the facts, does not have to be consid­
ered as having expressly or by reasons of its conduct acquiesced in the validity of 
the treaty or in its maintenance in force or operation (Art. 45 VC). If, within a 
period of not less than three months, no party has raised any objection, the party 
making the notification may withdraw from the treaty (Art. 65 II VC). The with­
drawal can - and, for reasons of proportionality and pursuant to the principle of 
favor conventionis, must - be confined to the provisions in conflict with internal 
law, if those are separable from the rest of the treaty with regard to their applica­
tion, if they do not constitute an essential basis of the other's party consent, and if 
the continued performance of the remainder is not unjust (Art. 44 III VC)."9 If, 
however, objections are raised after the said notification, the parties shall seek a 
solution through the means indicated in Art. 33 UN-Charter, i.e. negotiations, 
mediation, arbitration, decisions by a court etc (Art. 65 III).
If no solution has been reached within a period of 12 months following the date on which 
the objection was raised, any one of the parties may set in motion an obligatory concilia­
tion procedure by the UN, provided for in an appendix to the Vienna Convention (Art. 66 
b). Thereafter, a conciliation commission shall be set out, which is constituted of five con­
ciliators, two of whom may be named by the parties and the remaining one by the four 
other conciliators. The commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution.
"^Compare the summary in Müller/Wildhaber. Praxis des Volkcrrechts, 2nd ed. 1982, 9 el seq.
"®See Simma, Archiv des Ôffentlichen Rechts 100 ( 1975), 7 el seq.
117Jermiiigs/Watts (eds.), Oppenhcim's International Law, 9th ed 1992. Vol. I. peace. 1199, § 581.
118Verdross/Simma. Universelles Volkerrecht. 3rd ed. 1984, 53 et seq., §§ 83 et seq.; Cahier, Revue Générale 
de Droit International Public 76 (1972). 645; Frowein, in: Festschrift fiir Scheuner, 1973, 107; Con- 
forti/Labella, European J. of International Law 1 (1990), 44.
" A g i .  dazu JenningsAVatrs (eds.). Oppenheim's International Law, 9. Aufl. 1992, Vol. I, peace, 129 et seq., § 




























































































The report shall consist in recommendations submitted for the consideration of the parties 
in order to facilitate an amicable settlement; it shall not be binding upon them.
More problematic, however, is the question to what extent these procedural 
provisions can be recognised as international customary law. Since Art. 66 VC 
was introduced only at the Vienna Conference, it can hardly be qualified as such. 
This is primarily true for the jurisdiction of the ICJ in Art. 66 a VC, which applies 
only to the parties to the Vienna Convention who have signed it without reserva­
tion to this provision.220 *The same should be true for the details of the provisions 
concerning the conciliation procedure under the guidance of the UN and the 
deadlines which must be respected. However, the basic lines of the procedural 
implementation of the theory of evidence should be regarded as customary law, 
since otherwise, as already stated, the result would be an incomplete regulation 
posing threats to legal certainty. These basic features include: the duty of a state 
to notify the intended disapplication of international treaties (including the pos- 
siblity of making the notification in answer to another party claiming performance 
or alleging a violation), the principle of separability of single treaty provisions, 
the non-automatic relevance, in PIL, of the violation of internal law and finally 
the duty of a state to reach a conciliatory solution before unilaterally withdrawing 
from a treaty. This refers to the recourse to negotiations among the parties and 
other means for peaceful dispute settlement, and, if these efforts were to fail, to a 
neutral (albeit not binding) conciliation procedure.222 In addition, the duty of a 
state to search for a peaceful und just solution in any international dispute is al­
ready enshrined in Art. 2 Nr. 3, 33 UN-Charter; therefore, a fall-back to the Vi­
enna Convention is superfluous. In the case of disputes over the validity of treaty 
provisions, this duty can, by the very nature of things, only mean negotiations 
and, if these were to fail, a conciliation procedure. Correspondingly, for the lack 
of alternatives, one can assume a reduction of a state's discretion as to the appro­
priate means of dispute resolution in the sense of Art. 2 Nr. 2, 33 UN-Charter. 
Thereafter, a state alleging a manifest breach of essential internal law through an 
international treaty has the right to negotiations among the parties (or other ap­
propriate means of peaceful dispute resolution) and, if necessary, to a neutral 
conciliation procedure to be organised by the parties.222 An exception to this right 
could only apply when the allegation of breach is manifestly abusive or un­
founded. If the other MSS should deny such a procedure to the state in question, 
the presumption of PIL relevance of the alleged breach becomes irrebuttable. As 
a sort of self-executory "PIL-default judgement", the state in question may law­
120Verdross/Simma, Universelles Vôlkerrecht. 3rd ed. 1984. 535, § 840, Fn. 5.
121Conforti/Labella. European J. of International Law 1 (1990). 44 (46). Fn. 2 m.w.N; Calfisch, Zeitschrift für 
Schweizer Recht 112 (1993), 1-307 (31 et seq.)
222Compare Art. 33 (1) UN-Charter which reads: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution hy 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 




























































































fully assume the relevance, in PIL, of the alleged breach and withdraw from the 
treaty in question or respectively disapply the incriminating provisions.323
To sum up: According to the customary law version of the relevance theory, 
manifest breaches of essential national provisions, as opposed to any other viola­
tion of internal law, need not to be tolerated by a State. As a consequence, how­
ever, the violated internal provisions do not become automatically relevant at the 
PIL level, entailing the nullity (or partial nullity) of the conflicting intemation 
treaty. Rather, the state in question only has the right (and the duty) to a concilia­
tion procedure in which the question of the PIL relevance of the violated internal 
provisions will be decided definitely. Moreover, this rule means that the disappli- 
cation, by a state, of international law which is in conflict with essential internal 
law, cannot be equated to a "normal" treaty violation. Thus, the sanctions PIL 
provides for treaty violations may be applied only after a conciliation procedure. 
The procedural consequence is that the allegation of a manifest breach can be 
viewed as an exception to the duty of performance of a treaty. Finally, since no 
general duty of provisional application is stated in PIL. a state alleging a manifest 
breach should be allowed to disapply the treaty respectively the incriminating 
provisions of it pursuant to reasonable internal standards for interim measures as 
long as the conciliation procedure lasts.
5. Application of these principles to constitutional conflicts between 
the EC and its MSS
a) Resort to customary law
With regard to the possible application of the theory of evidence to constitu­
tional conflicts between the EC and its MSS, the customary law version of the 
PIL provisions has to be applied. Even though the substantive requirements of the 
Vienna convention could be complied with,323 its direct application is impossible, 
since it was enacted only after the EC-Treaty32S and since not all MSS of the EC 
have ratified it.326 However, this does not constitute any obstacle to the solution 
to be proposed here, since no relevant differences have been found between the 
two versions. *12456
323See Vamvoukos. Termination of Treaties in International Law, 1985, 2! et seq. (with particular reference to 
clausula rebus sic stantibus).
124Thc EC-Treaty is an international treaty between States (Art. 1. 2 Nr. 1 (a) VC), which - at least at the time 
of its conclusion - was the constituent instrument of an international organisation (Art. 5 VC).
i25In the case of a conflict provoked by secondary law, this obstacle could be superated as well. As will be 
shown immediately afterwards in the text, the treaty provisions conferring to the EC the power to enact secon­
dary law could be qualified as an authorisation to amend the original treaty by new sub-treaties to be concluded 
within the international organisation in the sense of Art. 5 2nd alternative VC. Thereafter, the VC could be 
applied to all such "sub-treaties" enacted after its conclusion.




























































































b) General applicability o f the evidence theory
In the first place, it has to be emphasised once more that in the EC a legal con­
flict resolution is even more important than in normal PIL conflicts. Because of 
the close "dovetailing" of important areas of policy, economy and law in the inte­
gration process, such conflicts would be capable of generating devastating effects 
on both the EC and its MSS. With respect to the (at least) de facto-irreversibility 
of the integration process, a withdrawal of a state from the EC, or the suspension 
of its membership, is not a viable solution. For these reasons, EC law cannot 
simply ignore the violation of fundamental internal law, but, as already stated, has 
to provide for a conciliation mechanism capable of enabling a state to remain in 
the EC without having to abandon constitutional essentials. It is clear that in such 
a procedure, all possible solutions must be available in principle, including the 
invalidation o f a EC act.
Now, since the EC has not yet evolved into a monistic federal system in which 
the MS would be hierarchically subordinated to the EC, but is characterised by 
the dualistic juxtaposition of several legal orders, constitutional conflicts fit 
structurally into the basic pattern of the theory of evidence: essential internal law 
is violated by an international treaty, and a solution has to be found in order to 
avoid fatal legal tensions and "conflicts of obligation" for citizens. Beyond that, it 
cannot be held that the application of the theory of evidence would be pre-empted 
by EC law. In the first place, it may be repeated that there is indeed a serious la­
cuna in the EC system as to the resolution of constitutional conflicts, since, as 
shown, the jurisdiction of the EC is limited in this respect.127 Next, following the 
dualistic logic, recourse to the theory of evidence is not precluded by the devel­
opment of judge-made human rights at EC level either, as long as they are not 
capable of protecting the constitutional identity of MSS. Finally, the resort to a 
quasi-judicial device is not pre-empted by Art. N, whereafter legislative modifi­
cations of primary law may only be adopted by the MS in an IGC. For we are not 
dealing here, stricto sensu, with a legislative modification of the treaties, but with 
the supplementation, by judicial resp. exegetic lawmaking, of EC law by existing 
international law. What is more, a conciliation device would not even contradict 
the ratio of Art. N: It would indeed seem reasonable and desirable with respect to 
the efficiency of EC law if the MS, as the "Masters of the Treaty", were not con­
fined to the cumbersome treaty modification procedure or the enactment of new 
secondary law, but could also exercise a supplementary quasi-judicial control 
over the application of EC law in cases in which their constitutional identity and, 
hence, their status as "Masters of the Treaty", is crucially at stake. Be that as it 
may, however, a functional equivalent to the theory of evidence is at any rate 
lacking at EC level, so that PIL may as shown at least be drawn upon as an emer­
gency regime.
727For this reason. Art. 219 TEC is not pertinent either. As shown, the TEC does not contain any device for the 




























































































However, as in all other matters of EC law, the existing acquis communautaire must be re­
spected here as well. This means that a PIL solution can only be applied in a subsidiary- 
way, if all intracommunitarian devices of conflict resolution have failed. As already stated, 
this means that a national constitutional court must respect Art. 177 III TEC and all other 
internal means of conflict avoidance must have been exhausted. Hence, according to Ger­
man constitutional law, not a single violation of constitutional essentials, but a "structural 
deficiency" in EC law or jurisprudence rendering probable the violation of the Grundgesetz 
in a multiplicity of future cases,128 must have been found.
c) Substantive requisites o f the evidence theory
First of all, it may be stated that a conflict between secondary law and national 
constitutions could be captured by the wording of the evidence theory in the Vi­
enna Convention: Even though general treaty law does not explicitly provide for 
the distinction between primary and secondary law, secondary law authorised by 
treaty provisions may be regarded as a "supplemental treaty" concluded by the 
organs of the international organisation set up by the "original treaty" (see Art. 5, 
2nd alternative VC), which, however, shall enjoy primacy over the supplemental 
provisions (i.e. secondary law). So, the PIL solution could be separately applied 
to a specific act of secondary law only - which is very important in the EC con­
text. Moreover, this also means that the state of development of international 
customary law at the time of the conclusion of the secondary law act is relevant 
with respect to the integration of substantive competence provisions in the evi­
dence theory.
In setting up the standard for relevant violations of internal law in line with the 
device of "community-conforming concrétisation and adaptation" of PIL, is must 
first be noted that several arguments in favour of the "theory of relevance" gain 
weight in the EC context. Thus, the EC’s respect of essential national law is all 
the more necessary because of the far-reaching homogenity between the EC and 
its MSS as to the respect of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; the 
hard core of human rights in particular, as an integral part of the national legal 
identity in the sense of Art. F I TEU, can be regarded as intracommunitarian ius 
cogens. Moreover, in the EC context, it is equally undesirable that basic national 
provisions may be circumvented at the EC level. The need for efficient national 
implementation is another argument. Since the EC system largely depends on na­
tional administrations which are sworn to uphold their own constitution, imposing 
a European norm violating national constitutions would be difficult in practice - 
notwithstanding the autonomous efficiency of the EC system which may, as 
shown, be derived from Arts. 169 ss. TEC. Furthermore, several arguments in 
favour of the "theory of irrelevance" seem to be less persuasive in the EC context. 
First, under a majority regime, a state does not any longer have the possibility to 
make the ratification of a "sub-treaty" (i.e. an act of secondary law) dependent on 
the non-existence of violations of internal law. Moreover, the argument that a




























































































state entering into an international treaty cannot be expected to investigate its 
partners' internal laws in order to avoid violations, loses weight, since the EC or­
gans have specialised lawyers from all MSS at their disposal, who can well be 
expected to enquire about potential violations of national law. For the latter rea­
son, the required degree of "manifestness" of a breach can be presumed to be 
lower than in the normal PIL context.
In line with the "dissuasive function" of the "manifestness" criterion, a breach 
has to be manifest at the moment of the adoption of secondary legislation by the 
competent EC organ; a subsequent decision by a national constitutional court 
would therefore be too late. Thus, by contrast to a violation of the European Con­
vention of Human Rights, the violation of a national constitutional right will not 
normally be obvious to other MSS of the EC.129 However, it should be sufficient 
that, in the Council procedure, a MS's representative draws the other council 
members' attention to a possible violation of the national constitution (or other 
essential internal law). Taking into account the increased loyality duties in the EC 
context, such a warning should be considered as sufficient to comply with the 
"manifestness" requirement. Conversely, in the EC context too, the right to in­
voke a ground for avoidance must be deemed to be lost whenever a State has, 
explicitly or tacitly, expressed its consent to the validity of the incriminated act 
(ratio of Art. 45 VCLT). In particular, a State may not have voted in favour of the 
act in the Council without expressing its constitutional reservations.
As a consequence, therefore, the procedure will mostly be carried out when the secondary 
law act in question has been taken by a majority decision against the vote of one or several 
MSS (as it has been true in the case of the Banana regulation). However, in the case of a 
"package deal”, the application of the evidence theory should not be pre-empted by the 
mere fact that a State - after having pronounced a warning as to the potential incompatibil­
ity of a part of the "package" with its own constitution - has voted in favor of the whole 
package for paramount reasons of self interest. The fact that with the possible anullation of 
a component of the package, the balance of the whole package is disturbed, should not 
justify a different result. For MSS have always to bear in mind the possibility that a compo­
nent of the package might be struck down as a result of constitutional review, regardless of 
whether this review has been undertaken by the ECJ or a conciliation body.
However, also in the EC context, the needs of a smooth functioning of the EC 
and of legal certainty prevent a violation of essential internal law from being 
automatically relevant at the level of EC law. Rather, just as in PIL, a MS alleg­
ing such a breach can only be accorded the right (and the duty) that a conciliation 
procedure be carried out. All in all, it may be concluded that, as far as the sub­
stantive side of the theory of evidence is concerned, its direct application largely 
fits the structural pecularities of the EC.
d) Procedural requirements
Somewhat more complicated, since it is less acurately regulated in PIL, is the




























































































procedural realisation of an manifest breach of essential internal law. Four main 
issues have to be separated: The limitation of the procedure on the conflicting 
provisions of secondary conflict (aa), the negotiation stage (bb), the concilitation 
procedure in case negatiations fail (cc) and the legal consequences in the case 
such a procedure is denied to the aggrieved party (dd).
aa) Limitation of the procedure to the conflicting provisions
As to the procedural implementation of the theory of evidence, first, the con­
ciliation procedure has to be limited to the secondary legislation in question - 
which has been interpreted as a supplementary treaty in the sense of Art. 5 2nd 
alt. VCLT. Beyond that, following the ratio legis of Art. 44 VCLT, even a limita­
tion of the procedure on the incriminating provisions of the act in question seems 
necessary, in order to minimise its disintegrative effects.730 In both cases, the 
separability requirements contained in Art. 44 paragr. 3 must be fulfilled. 
Whereas, thereafter, a junctim with the ongoing validity of the primary law basis 
of the secondary law act or even the whole EC-Treaty seems to be excluded, the 
avoidance of the secondary act in question might deprive accompanying measures 
of their conceptual basis ("Geschaftsgrundlage").
bb) The negotiation stage
As to the negotiation stage provided for in PIL (see Art. 65 III VCLT and Art. 
33 UN-Charter), no particular measures seem to be necessary since the standing 
organs of the EC always have the discretion to revoke or amend an act allegedly 
in conflict with internal law. However, if such negotiations or other peaceful 
means of dispute settlement fail within a reasonable period of time (one year, as 
proposed in the Vienna Convention, seems appropriate if no other time limit is 
fixed) a conciliation procedure has to take place as stated.
cc) Establishment, procedure and effects of the decisions of a conciliation
body
Even though the need of its existence is derived from PIL, there must be an up­
grading from a PIL to EC constitutional law standard with respect to the estab­
lishment, procedure and composition of a conciliation body. The PIL conciliation 
model of the VC is not even applicable as a last resort here. In particular, an ad 
/ioc-nomination of the body by the executive, its composition of conciliators only 
from both sides and the non-binding character of its decision would not fit the 
legal character of the EC. Because of the constitutionalisation of the treaties by 
the ECJ, and particularly as a consequence of the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy, the EC participates in the exercise of public power directly affecting 
the citizen. This means that the EC and its organs must meet democratic stan-
woThis argument refutes the objection against the application of Art. 46 Vienna Convention raised by Streinz 
(Grundrechtsschutz, 1989, 32 et seq.) and Weiler/Haltern (37 Harvard Int. L. J. (1996), 411,441, Fn. 115) that 




























































































dards (however, because of its essential structural pecularities, it cannot be ex­
pected to comply with democratic principles of the exactly identical shape and to 
the same degree as MSS).WJ Accordingly, it follows that an organ deciding as the 
ultimate umpire over the recognition of a national constitutional standard in hu­
man rights or in other fields at EC level - and exactly this would be the effect of a 
conciliation decision - must be democratically legitimated. Therefore, a concilia­
tion body would need to be set up by the European legislator.* 132
The establishment of a conciliation body would thus require a regulation or a Treaty 
amendment. In theory, a regulation could be considered as sufficient: For if the theory of 
evidence is regarded as an integral part of intra-communitarian law, it would only need to 
be completed as regards the procedure to be followed etc., without causing any conflict to 
the Treaties as they stand. However, the only legal base on which such a regulation might 
be founded is Art. 235 TEC. Taking into account the ancillary "gap-filling" function of this 
provision, it seems however overstated to base an important change of the institutional 
structure of the EC only on it.133 At best, an "emergency regulation” serving as a transitory 
legal base for a conciliation procedure till the more cumbersome treaty amendment proce­
dure (Art. N TEU) might be based on Art. 235 TEC.
Beyond that, it should be noted with respect to the composition of the concilia­
tion body that, since the procedure is to contribute to the control exercised by the 
MSS over the application of EC law, their representatives should have a strong 
voice in the conciliation body. Correspondingly, the body might well be made up 
of judges of the national constitutional resp. highest courts and the ECJ following 
the example of socalled "common senats" (Gemeinsame Senate) known in Ger­
man procedural law.i3<
As far as its contents is concerned, a conciliation decision would in principle - 
in line with its (quasi-) judicial quality - be confined to declaring a breach of es­
sential national law relevant or not at EC level. This should be done by balancing 
the intensity of the breach, the desirable standard of human rights protection at 
the EC level, the consequences for the EC arising out of the disapplication of the 
act at stake etc; in doing so, the conciliation body would have to start from from 
the rebuttable presumption of relevance following from a state's allegation of an
^Incidentally, this finding must be also taken into account when interpreting Art. 23 Basic Law and similar 
constitutional provisions of other Member States, whereafter a Member State is only allowed to participate in a 
Community meeting inter alia basic democratic standards.
132E\en de lege ferenda, it seems excluded to establish the ECJ as an arbitration board. This follows from the 
fact that, as shown, such a procedure would be admissible only as ultima ratio and that the ECJ would have to 
have dealt with it before according ordinary treaty law. Thus, by dealing with the same case again as an arbi­
tration board, the ECJ would act as a judge in its own case.
133See I. Schwartz. in Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlermann (eds.), Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, 5th ed. 1997, 
Art. 235, No. 1-8.
i54Similarly, Weiler and Haltern (see above, text and fn. 51 et seq.) recommended that a European Constitu­
tional Council be composed of national constitutional court judges and presided by the President of the ECJ. 
However, the latter might have already contributed to the ECJ's former decision about the Community act in 
question and might therefore be considered as biased. For this reason, if members of the ECJ are supposed to 





























































































Besides avoiding or maintaining a European act, the conciliation body could also have re­
course to "mitigating mechanisms" used at times by national constitutional courts. Thus, it 
might further a compromise by not declaring a European act void with immediate effect but 
by demanding its (possibly only partial) substitution within a reasonable period of time. In 
addition, after setting aside a European act, it could set forth more or less precise require­
ments a similar European act would be expected to meet in order to be compatible with the 
treaties and the core of national constitutions.* 135 Even such a far-reaching intertwining of 
the judiciary and the legislature would seem acceptable in the EC.
Next, with regard to the close relationship of the MSS in an integrated com­
munity and the need of legal uniformity in the EC, the decision of the conciliation 
body should be directly applicable and binding erga omnes136 at EC level. Even 
in PIL, the non-binding character of the report of the conciliation commission was 
agreed upon only as a compromise formula, which for many countries did not go 
far enough. All the more, it would be inappropriate in the EC context. Finally, 
through its erga omnes effect, the decision on the exceptional relevance of na­
tional norms (e.g. constitutional human rights) at the European level would indi­
rectly adapt the "contours" of the corresponding European rights to those of the 
national provisions. Thus, such a procedure would be capable of bringing about a 
gradual convergence between European and national law standards. Since, in the 
case of conflict, the conciliation decision would have to enjoy priority over the 
ECJ's interpretation of Community law, there would not be any dangers of a con­
tradictory jurisprudence and, thus, legal uncertainty.
Finally, it should be noted once more that the European legislator may of course 
forego the application and procedural concrétisation of the theory of evidence 
along the lines just described in favour of another institutional arrangement. "This 
would only have to ensure a legal solution to constitutional conflicts. However, as 
long as no other device exists, the fail-back on the theory of evidence remains 
obligatory.
dd) Legal consequences in the case of denial of a conciliation procedure
Starting from the ECJ's premises as to the unlimited primacy of European law 
over national law, the logical consequence would be that the ECJ's jurisdiction 
over EC law is exclusive. On that basis, it should be expected that the EC denies 
a conciliation procedure to a MS alleging the breach of its constitution. However,
WSsee for an extreme example the judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court on the new German abortion
law (BVerfGE 88. 103 (25let seq.). There, the court concretised the constitutional requirements as to the pro­
tection of the fetus by imposing a minimum standard (the so called "UntermaBverbot"). See critically Haiti, 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1993. 98 et seq. Even such a far-reaching competence of a judicial organ seems to 
fit the legal character of the Community. With regard to the latter point, see below text accompanying Fn. 138.
^ 6If, however, the European act in question falls within an area where differentiation according to conven­
tional Treaty law or closer cooperation pursuant to the new Amsterdam rules is possible, it might be attempted 
by the European legislator to convert the European act at issue into "relative law", valid only in the Member 




























































































since PIL cannot be disposed of arbitrarily by the EC, the latter could not legiti­
mately deny a MS such a procedure without offering a functionally adequate EC 
law substitute. Therefore, the PIL solution would seem appropriate even for that 
case: The presumption of the relevance, in EC law, of the alleged violation of the 
constitution becomes irrebuttable, and the MS in question may lawfully discard 
the application of the incriminating act.J37 This could be perceived as the utmost 
legal consequence of the remaining responsability of the MSS for the EC.
In practice, the declaration by a national judge of the definite disapplication of a European 
act should however be dispensable. As will be explained, under certain conditions, the MS 
can grant measures of interim relief when asking the EC for a conciliation procedure. If, 
however, the EC makes no effort to do so, the State in question can simply continue the 
interim measures, and no other steps seem to be necessary. However, it the EC not only 
denies a conciliation procedure to a MS, but also starts a Treaty violation procedure (Art. 
169 TEC) with respect to the transitory disapplication, by way of the said interim meas­
ures, of the European act at stake, a political solution would finally be unavoidable.
6. Dogmatical and legal theory implications of this solution
a) EC law
The concrétisation of Art. 5 TEC and F I TEU through the theory of evidence, 
as elaborated in the previous sections, can be summed up in that a MS has the 
right to invoke a manifest violation of constitutional law as an exception to its 
duty of performance. By doing so, it can ask for a conciliation procedure, in 
which the question will be ultimately decided by a neutral body. A treaty viola­
tion procedure pursuant to Art. 169 TEC would be admissible if the State in 
question refuses to obey the conciliation decision. Thus, the duties of loyality and 
of the respect of the constitutional identity of a MS constitute an exception to the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction and to the doctrine of unlimited supremacy of EC law, which 
may be limited through the exceptional "victory" of national law in the concilia­
tion procedure. As a result, this should be a dogmatic way out of the alleged 
"structural conflict".
Next, if a state has the right that a conciliation procedure be carried out, all in­
terim measures preparing such a procedure - especially measures capable of 
avoiding the "de facto-anticipation" of the decision by factual circumstances 
("Vorwegnahme der Hauptsache” in German administrative law terminology) - 
must be allowed by virtue of standing case law, constituting an exception to Art. 
185, 186 TEU.W* So, the disapplication of the challenged act of secondary legis­
lation pending the decision of the conciliation body would be lawful in cases 
where the individuals or firms concerned would otherwise face the danger of irre­
versible losses or bankruptcy. However, any national measures capable of un- 1378
137Sec above, text accompanying Fn. 119.





























































































dermining the pratical efficiency of the (future) conciliation decision would gen­
erally still be illegal. This would be particulary true for a national constitutional 
court decision declaring nationally inapplicable European provisions before the 
conciliation procedure is completed. In Germany, such a decision would have 
legal force pursuant to Art. 31 of the Statute on the FCC (Bundesverfassungsge- 
richtsgesetz). Such a decision would not, though, be relevant at the EC level, it 
would not exclude a conciliation procedure to be carried out, and it would not 
create problems unless the MS in question looses the conciliation procedure. 
However, renouncing a priori the factual possibility of respecting a future deci­
sion by an international dispute settlement body is in itself a clear violation of in­
ternational law.
b) Public International Law
Next, the applicability of the theory of evidence entails very important conse­
quences even if, contrary to the position advocated here, one considers EC law as 
a completetely decoupled self-contained regime with regard to constitutional 
conflicts and, as a consequence thereof, does not admit the application of the the­
ory in the intracommunitarian legal sphere. In this case, even the disapplication of 
EC acts by way of interim measures would be illegal under EC law. Now, how­
ever, if a state decided to leave the basis of the EC order by doing so, this does 
not mean that we are in a legal vaccum. Rather, PIL must then be resorted to as 
an emergency regime. As shown, it does allow for the disapplication of an inter­
national treaty, but only under the very restrictive conditions of the theory of evi­
dence. Therefore, the competence o f Constitutional control, retained by the FCC, 
would, insofar as it were to include the avoidance o f an EC act without a previ­
ous conciliation procedure according to PIL, be a massive violation o f PIL in­
dependent from its incompatibility with EC law.
Even if one should feel inclined to discard the direct applicability of the theory of evidence 
as to substantive competence limits of the treaty-making power of a state (or for other PIL 
reasons), the lesson to be drawn from PIL should be at least that a legal solution is to be 
found for constitutional conflicts. Thus, at any rate, before setting aside a European act, a 
MS has to make every reasonable effort in order to establish a legal mechanism capable of 
conflict solving. This obligation should again be derived from Art. 23 Basic Law as well as 
from  Art. 5 TEC and F I  TEU.
c) National constitutional law
On the level of national constitutional law, this solution has important implica­
tions as well. As stated, the integration clauses of the Grundgesetz aim at a stable 
EC governed by the rule of law. Otherwise, the homogenity requirements Art. 23 
Basic Law imposes on the EC would be completely illusory. Now, since there is 
a PIL procedure capable of decreasing the potential disintegrative effect of consti­
tutional conflicts, German institutions would be bound to make use of it. Thus, 
setting aside secondary legislation without substantial efforts by German organs 




























































































and EC law but also of national constitutional law.
d) Legal theory implications for the structure o f the Union and the relation­
ship o f EC and national law
Finally, the consequences in legal theory of the concrétisation of the EC's soli­
darity duty with respect to the MS shall be expounded. As to the localisation of 
the conciliation procedure within the EC system, a conciliation body might best 
be conceived of as an organ of the Union, competent for the procedural imple­
mentation of Art. F I TEU read together with the theory of evidence. Thus, the 
Union's "roof construction" above the MSS and the Communities, otherwise 
nearly devoid of content, could be rendered useful for the sake of legal coordina­
tion between them. This construction would comply well with the rationale of a 
Union containing the supranational Communities and counteracting burocratic 
autodynamics. Along these lines, the three-tier structure of the Union might even 
be characterised as the very initial stage of a - federal or confederal - "all-state" 
structure, similar to the famous theoretical debate in the fifties and early sixties 
about the structure of German and Austrian federalism.'39
This debate focused on the question whether the federal structure consisted of two or three 
entities ("zwei- Oder dreigiiedriger Bundesstaat”): the Laender (the States), the Bund (the 
Federation) and possibly also a third level representing the State as a whole 
("Gesamtstaat"), on which, among other things, conflicts between the Laender and the 
Bund could be solved. This reconstruction resolves the conflict that, under the Basic Law, 
the Bund is in some respects supraordinated, in others on an equal footing with the 
Laender, in favour of the highest "coordination competence" of the "Gesamtstaat". This 
puts the Laender and the Bund together as complementary parts of one polity, and, thus, 
represents them as one coherent unity. Under the constitution, Bund and Laender are 
awarded different competences and are, for this very reason, within their relative sphere of 
competence the highest, and hence, sovereign, legal entity. Furthermore, the constitutions 
of the Bund and the Laender are derived from the constitution of the Gesamtstaat. The 
latter possesses legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
This view was critised, though, by the partisans of a two-tier federalism (who were joined by the FCC in 
the Hessen-judgment'30), as a theoretical castle in the air. In reality, only two entities could be found: The 
Bund and the Laender.'3'  The three-tier construction would only pursue the aim of awarding the Laender 
sovereignty and an equal footing with respect to the Bund; thus, what was at stake in reality was not the 
delimitation of real political task, but the question of hierarchy and supremacy. The real problems of the 
federal state, however, go well beyond the delimitation of several squeres of competence, and lie at the in­
terface of several centers of decision-making: in the influence of the Bund on the Laender (legal control, 
intervention, administrative execution, political homogenity etc.) and, conversely, in the participation of 
the Laender in the decisions of the Bund (second chamber, constitutional amendments etc.) and, finally, in 
the mechanisms of achieving compromises between the two entities. The three-tier model would distort this *140
'" T h e  three-tier model goes back to Kelsen (Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1925 (reprint 1966), 199 et seq.) and 
Nawiasky (Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3. Teil, 1956. 151 et seq.). See e.g. Hesse, Grundziige des Verfas- 
sungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20. Aufi. 1995. 96 at Fn. 1; for an instructive summary, see 
Stein, Staatsrecht, 13th ed. 1991, 310 et seq. For Austria, see Oehlinger, Der Bundesstaat zwischen Reiner 
Rechtslehre und Verfassungsrealital, 1976.
140 See BVerfGE 13, 53 (77).




























































































finely-tuned system by overemphasising the delimitation of competences and the question of hierarchy. 
Analysing these two positions, it must be admitted, though, that the difference between them is not very 
big, because the different notions are to be found at different levels of comprehension, and because they 
have a partly complementary function. In the first place, undoubtedly, the Gesamtstaat is not a political 
entity existing in reality. Rather, it is but a theorem, embodying the idea of unity of the Bund and the 
Laender as a political-ethical idea, a fictitious subject of imputability of the common good, which brings 
together all constitutional elements which, legally or factually, guarantee this unity. In the reality of the 
German political system, the competences of the Gesamtstaat are also pursued by the Bund; the latter is, in 
one entity, Zentral- and Gesamtstaat, part of the whole, and its guarantor. 142 143In so far, the three-tier con­
struction is indeed not needed at the German level. Notwithstanding that, it is a useful tool for the recon­
struction of the competence structure, which is one of the paramount goals of the Pure Theory of Law. 
However, as opposed to the German situation, a three-tier structure does, albeit in a very initial stage, exist 
at EC level, consisting of the Union which the European Council as its own institution, and below it both 
the Communities and the MSS. If the Union, according to what has been proposed here, is also competent 
to conciliate conflicts between the Communities and the MS, a three-tier model seems to make sense. This 
structure would be monistic in so far as the decisions of the conciliation body would be respected. Since, as 
explained, they are however not binding de lege lata under national constitutional law, the present constel­
lation might be qualified, by analogy to conflict of laws tcrminlogy, as one of "limping monism".*45 Howe­
ver, an important difference with respect to the classic three-tier Kelsenian model can not be overlooked: 
The Union as the third level is relatively weak, its legal competence-competence being limited by the con­
stitutional essentials of the MSS. In so far, one may note a meaningful substantive law-"intertwining" of 
the three-tier structure: While, on the one hand, the Union is supraordinated to the MS, on the other this 
position is limited in that a primary law norm close to the Union Grundnorm stipulates the identity­
relevant components of the national legal systems as prior-ranking at EC level, albeit contained by the me­
chanism of a "concordance-oriented optimisation" of the underlying colliding principles. Beyond that, the 
critique of the three-tier model of German federalism is also partly true for the European Union: Its legal 
and political reality is indeed not so much characterised by questions of supremacy and the delimitation of 
competences, but rather by the multiple and complex "dovetailing" of buracracies, politics, and law. Howe­
ver, this does not change the fact that these questions are crucial for the resolution of constitutional con­
flicts which happen in reality, even if they are (luckily) not the part of the Union's daily business. Further­
more, it must be stressed that the three-tier model does not even claim to reconstruct the multiple relati­
onship of the Union and the MS in an exhaustive way.
To sum up, the three-tier construction of "limping monism" advocated here 
seems to be capable of avoiding the dangers of an unlimited dualism to a large 
extent, under which two legal orders stand side by side like medieval strongholds 
and restrict the relationships between each other, to the ultimate detriment of 
both. If one wishes to take up again Paul Kirchhofs "bridge metaphor", the three 
tier-construction may be conceived as the Florentin Ponte Vecchio, with the 
conciliation mechanism being a common European house on the bridge.
7. Summary of the procedural consequences
As to the procedure to follow for a national constitutional court, the following 
summary may be stated: If it were to regard a European act, assessed by the ECJ 
to be in conformity with EC law, as a violation of the own constitution, it would 
have to suspend the procedure and refer the case to the ECJ pursuant to Art. 177 
III TEC if the latter has not yet had the opportunity to pronounce itself on all the
^-Compare Isensee in: Isensee/Kirchhoff (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechls IV, § 98, C, 562 e! seq.
143ln Private International Law. the expression "liaison boileuse" is used to describe a legal relationship which 
is not recognised as legally valid in all states involved. The example par excellence is a marriage, which, for 
the lack of certain legal preconditions (e.g. one state recognised religious marriages, the other does not), is not 




























































































relevant legal issues. In the reference decision it may already indicate, in the form 
of an obiter dictum of course, that it intends to demand a conciliation procedure if 
the ECJ were to approve the incriminating provisions again.
If however the ECJ should actually do so, a new reference concerning the concrétisation of 
Art. 5 TEC in the sense of the theory of relevance would not be necessary. For. first, the 
application of general international law cannot be disposed of by the EC as long as it does 
not provide for a specific functional equivalent. Secondly and decisively, the the ECJ would 
be biased as to this question since it relates indirectly to its own competences. For this very 
reason it would even be irrelevant if the ECJ - in response to the obiter dictum in the refer­
ence decision or simply for "preventive" reasons - were to deny the concrétisation of Art. 5 
proposed here by claiming unlimited jurisdiction.
Thus, if the conflict is not resolved by a cooperation between the ECJ and na­
tional courts in the Art. 177 TEC procedure as stated, the constitutional court, 
backed by its own government, should demand a conciliation procedure to be 
carried out. In this regard, it would first of all have to notify the EC and all other 
MSS. The procedure before the constitutional court might still be suspended in 
the meantime; the provisory disapplication of the incriminating European provi­
sions might be ensured by interim measures. Now, three alternatives are possible:
I ) The EC establishes a conciliation body and this decides in favour o f the MS 
declaring the European act in question void erga omnes (or only with respect to 
the MS alleging the breach, if upholding it as a measure o f closer cooperation 
might appear feasible). Then, the procedure before the constitutional court might 
simply be stopped.
2) The EC establishes a conciliation body and this decides in favour o f the EC 
by upholding the act in question. As already stated, regardless of whether one 
considers the decision to be binding under EC law, it would at any rate not be 
binding de lege lata under national constitutional law. If the national limits to in­
tegration were complied with, the constitutional court would not be prevented 
from finding a violation of the Constitution and setting aside the act for the terri­
tory of the MS. The conciliation solution proposed here would then have failed as 
well. However, as also expounded, the "cumulative weight" of the Basic Law's 
mandates to further European integration and to guarantee the respect for inter­
national law might probably enable the Constitutional Court to give up, by virtue 
of the balancing principle of practical concordance, more constitutional ground in 
the field of human rights or elsewhere, than before.144 Beyond that, the denial of 
respecting and implementing a conciliation decision would now be a clear viola­
tion of EC law. and the Commission could start a Treaty violation procedure pur­
I44U is submitted here that the constitutional court might well change its opinion after the report of the con- 
ciliation body, to which political pressure and the undoubtedly higher level of acceptance might contribute. In 
particular, even if the procedural rules on the conciliation should presuppose the conviction of the constitu­
tional court of the inconstitutionality of the Community act in question for the initiation of a procedure (similar 
to Art. 100 Basic Law, which presupposes the conviction of the lower court judge of the incompatibility of a 
law with the constitution), this would not prevent it from changing its conviction later. For. this is exactly the 




























































































suant to Art. 169 TEC.
3) In response to the State's claim that a conciliation procedure be carried 
out, the EC denies any such possiblity by claiming exclusive jurisdiction for the 
ECJ or by alleging other reasons. As stated above, such a reaction would indeed 
be the logical consequence of the EC’s (however unfounded, as shown) presump­
tion of supraordination and unlimited supremacy of EC law over national consti­
tutional law. As a result, the constitutional conflict would remain unresolved. 
However, since it brings about the juridification of constitutional conflicts, the 
solution proposed here would still have considerable advantages even in that 
case. For the EC, the outcome would be positive in that the potential threat to 
destroy the uniformity of EC law would be decreased, and another "level of de- 
escalation" would be introduced. It would even be up to the EC to avoid any dan­
ger by setting up a conciliation procedure. The advantages for the MS lie in the 
fact that it would not longer have to resort to clearly illegal devices in order to 
guarantee respect for its constitution. Particularly, the claim to respect common 
PIL standards rather than merely the alleged constraints of its own internal law 
would be more prone to sympathy by other MSS. Furthermore, by discarding the 
negative effects of the current regime, the positive effect of the national compe­
tence of constitutional review would become plain. In addition, this solution, even 
if not carried out, might at least make European and national politicians more 
sensitive as to the pathological points of unlimited supremacy of EC law; and 
thus, it might ideally allow for a common solution in European and national con­
stitutional law of these issues. Finally and most importantly, the threat to establish 
a competing organ for constitutional adjudication puts the ECJ under pressure to 
avoid constitutional conflicts. Thus, the solution might have the effect of a So- 
lange III decision, and like its famous predecessors, it would prove most effective 
if it could contribute to preventing a violation of national constitutions by Euro­
pean acts - all this, however, without the negative flavour of the current Cold 
War scenario.
8. A too far-reaching constitutional reform in PIL clothes?
A principal misgiving about this solution could be the fact that it constitutes a 
too far-reaching law-making in the sensitive area of constitutional law. This cri­
tique may be first countered by emphasising the low law-making component of 
this solution as compared to e.g. the ECJ's jurisprudence on state liability. Rather, 
we are dealing with the simple application of PIL norms, which are unaltered in 
their substance. Already for this reason, it is hardly admissible to say that only the 
political organs of a State might venture out into a conciliation solution de lege 
ferenda, but not judicial organs de lege lata.
However, when evaluating the institutional implications of this solution, one 
will have to admit that they are indeed overwhelming. We are dealing with noth­
ing more or less than a constitutional reform of the Union system in PIL clothes, 




























































































sarily less efficient, constitutional adjudication structure. However, it is to be ar­
gued that such a development fits the structural pecularities of the EC and the 
Union well. For the specific features of the intracommunitarian division of func­
tions are widely different to the separation of powers in European nation states. 
Because of lower levels of political consensus, legal solutions are bound to play a 
conspicuously more important role in the EC, as compared to the MS. Thus, even 
societal, political and constitutional essentials, which would and could be decided 
by politics in the Nation States, are left to the judiciary in the EC setting.145 Pre­
sumably, the best example is provided by the famous doctrines concerning the 
relationship of EC and national law (direct effect, primacy etc.), which, though 
being judicial inventions, were implicitly approved by the MSS. In a Nation State 
political environment, it would have been impossible to invent a norm like "EC 
law breaks national law"; as is well known, a similar norm is even contained in 
Art. 31 Basic Law concerning the relationship of federal and state law within 
Germany. It follows from this that the status of the judiciary, and therefore also 
its responsability, is much more important in the EC system. Now, it seems per­
fectly suited to this particular status that the judiciary itself develops constitu­
tional solutions for institutional problems, all the more so if those are of a genu­
inely legal nature and can be widely solved by the application of existing law, 
albeit not EC law itself. However, since the concrétisation of Art. 5 TEC in the 
sense proposed here would weaken the ECJ’s position in favour of a more poly­
centric structure of constitutional adjudication, such a solution can clearly not be 
expected from this court. Rather, national constitutional and high courts, together 
with their governments, are called upon to develop such a solution. All in all, if 
one shares the authors's opinion that, on the one hand, the unbridled dualism of 
the two legal orders reflected in the cold war between their two judiciaries is 
highly detrimental to the stable and democratic development of the Union and, 
therefore, is to be replaced by a more monistic overall structure, and that, on the 
other hand, the political potential for the development of such an instituitonal so­
lution is rather small, there hardly seems to exist any alternative to the present 
legal solution.
To sum up: As opposed to the other "federal conflict of laws doctines" devel­
oped by the European judiciary to enhance the effet utile of European law, the 
concrétisation of Art. 5 TEC and Art. F I TEU along the lines of the PIL theory of 
evidence adds an important institutional mechanism capable of mediating consti­
tutional conflicts and ensuring a possibly better constitutional balance between 
the EC and its MSS. At the same time, the residual national competence of con­
stitutional control over European acts would be stipulated as an integral part of 
the checks and balances of the EU's constitution. Thus, the widely critisised, but, 
under a dualistic system and under standing law, unavoidable challenge to the 
ECJ by national constitutional courts, would result in a positive outcome.





























































































This contribution starts from the new and dangerous escalation, in the "Banana 
saga", of the conflict between the European Court of Justice and the German FCC 
concerning the residual competence of the latter to review European acts to be 
applied in Germany on grounds of constitutionality. In the first part, it is shown 
that this conflict is largely structural in that it is but the logical consequence of the 
contrary conceptions of both courts as to the limited vs. the unlimited supremacy 
of European law. According to the German Basic Law, on the one hand, the 
devolution of sovereign powers to the EC is limited (Art. 24 old version. Art. 23 
new version Basic Law). Like any other constitutional provisions, these limits to 
integration have to be monitored by the FCC, which forces this court to indirectly 
review European law over the "bridge" of the German ratification statutes. By 
contrast, no such reservation in favour of national constitutions is contained in the 
EC Treaties, which is quite understandable, since it might have a fatal effect on 
legal unity within the EC. According to the ECJ's understanding of the nature of 
the EC, on the other hand, the EC Treaties would have cut the ties to their roots 
in international and national constitutional law and would have metamorphasised 
into a Constitution in the true sense of the term. If this 'emancipation' did not hap­
pen already at the foundation stage, it must be at least conceded as a result of the 
constitutionalisation process which has taken place in the meantime. Conse­
quently, the MSS would no longer be "Masters of the Treaties", who could con­
trol and modify them at any given moment. Rather, through the emancipation of 
the Treaties from the national statutes of ratification, a constitutional control 
through the review of these statutes would no longer be possible; thus, they 
would have become an interrupted bridge in the Avignon style.
Since both positions are, per se, theoretically coherent, but start from different 
premises, a further clarification can only be achieved through a critical analysis of 
the well-foundedness of these premises. Such an analysis must go beyond the 
bonds of positive law and resort to a theoretical reconstruction of both positions. 
As analytical devices, this reconstruction makes use of the Pure Theory of Law 
and institutional legal positivism. The first result is that EC law is a legal order on 
its own and not just an appendix of the national law of each MS. For at least the 
sanctions which may be imposed under Art. 169 et seq. TEC and, which, as a 
very last resort, might be completed by PIL sanctions of other MSS acting as 
trustors of the EC, endow EC law with a minimum of autonomous (i.e. independ­
ent from national law) efficiency. Thus, a monistic model with supraordination of 
national law is untenable. The second result is that a monism with supraordination 
of EC law, as advocated by the functional theory held by the ECJ, is untenable as 
well, since it would render possible in theory an unlimited intrusion of EC law 
into national law. The establishment of such a powerful EC, which would also 
have violated their constitutions by foregoing their sovereignty to a large extent, 




























































































structure with supraordination of EC law has not in the meantime been achieved 
through the constitutionalisation process either. For MS have never agreed on 
such an incisive change of the EC's status. Furthermore, it cannot be implicitly 
assumed either, since nearly all constitutional resp. highest courts of the MS do 
not in principle exclude the constitutional review of EC law which is to be ap­
plied on national territory. As a consequence, the relationship of EC and national 
law can only be conceived of as dualistic. This interpretation indeed comes clos­
est to the reality of two visibly separate legal orders protected by two powerful 
judicial guardians. This means that we are dealing with two principally independ­
ent systems with two different Grimdnormen, between which no conflicts of va­
lidity, but only "conflicts of obligation" for the citizens may arise. With respect to 
"bridging norms" between the two orders as, in particular, the supremacy rule, the 
dualistic model implies that those norms cannot, by definition, change the dualis­
tic structure itself and, thus, may not bring about a legal revolution through the 
annexion of a legal order under the Grundnorm of the other. This means that the 
premise of the FCC, whereafter national law is competent to decide on the degree 
of influence of EC law on its own legal order, is correct in principle. An unlimited 
supremacy of EC law, uncontrollable by national courts, would only be possible 
under a model of monistic supraordination of EC, and is therefore to be exluded 
under a dualistic model. For the possibilities of conflict resolution, the dualistic 
model sets up important premises. First, it implies that there is no hierarchical 
supra- or subordination between both legal orders. Since supremacy is limited 
there, "Grundnom-relevant" conflicts can only be resolved through judicial col­
laboration in which both courts must agree on a standard of protection of consti­
tutional fundamentals like human rights, which is acceptable for both of them 
(here so-called concordance solution). Even though, on the basis of the pluralistic 
model, not all legal conflicts can be solved legally, it is further submitted that, 
before a capitulation of law in the face of constitutional conflicts, all legal 
mechanism of conflict avoidance and resolution must be fully exhausted.
In the remainder of the article, it will be attempted to implement these theoreti­
cal findings at the level of positive law. After a short analysis of the restricted 
possibilities of conflict avoidance of national constitutional law, the resources of 
EC law are analysed further. First of all, it is argued that the cooperation and 
solidarity duties enshrined in Arts. 5 TEC and F I TEU force the ECJ to take into 
account national constitutional essentials much more than in the past. In particu­
lar, it is claimed that the ECJ must explicitly refer to the jurisprudence of national 
constitutional courts. In doing so. the ECJ must, however, also bear in mind the 
needs of the EC, since the membership in a stable community is also a constitu­
tional essential of all MSS. It is further argued that the chances of a concordance 
solution may be considerably increased through such a problem-oriented dis­
course on common constitutional standards. If, however, such a solution were to 
fail, it is submitted that the ECJ can not be the ultimate umpire over EC law to be 




























































































reach of the supremacy norm which it is bound to protect. Beyond that, the ECJ 
would not be a neutral institution either with respect to its task as the guardian of 
EC law. Having ascertained this limitation of the ECJ's jurisdiction, the choice 
must now be made between deliberately leaving the conflict open (and thus al­
lowing the Cold War between the Courts to continue), or searching for a con­
ciliation solution through a third instance. With respect to the fact that leaving 
open the conflict could be highly detrimental for the stability of the EC and its 
democratic evolution (since a first blow of a national constitutional court is never 
excluded and could even become more probable after the East enlargement), the 
decision is taken in favour of a conciliation solution, even though it entails a 
massive intrusion into the existing institutional balance in the Union.
Though it is of course the primary task of the European legislator to establish 
such a procedure, it may be shown that the essentials of such a solution can al­
ready be derived from existing law. The points of departure in EC law are the 
basic provisions of the Treaty as to the interplay of EC and national law: the duty 
of the EC to respect the national identity of MSS (Art. F I TEU) and the general 
duty of loyality (Art. 5 TEC), which was extended by the ECJ to also include ob­
ligations of the EC with regard to MSS. Since a EC law concrétisation of these 
provisions is not sufficient to come to grips with constitutional conflicts, recourse 
must be had to the acknowledged devices of gap-filling. By doing so, only the 
application of PIL principles seems promising. In this context, it is first claimed 
that a fail-back to PIL as an emergency regime must be allowed even in a widely 
self-contained regime like the EC, at least as long as EC law does not contain any 
pertinent rules and the PIL provisions in question do not create contradictions 
with the structural pecularities of the EC. The contrasting view would preclude 
the application of norms potentially useful for conflict resolution unnecessarily. 
Second, it is shown that PIL may not only be applied directly, but also used as a 
"legal quarry" in order to elaborate general principles of law which can deal bet­
ter with the specific features of the EC. Thus, a virtue shall be made out of the 
necessity of resorting to PIL.
The PIL provisions relevant here are the customary law rules on the exceptional 
relevance, in PIL, of the violation of internal law through the conclusion of a 
Treaty, which have been codified in Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties of 1969. Thereafter, only the manifest violation of essential internal 
law regarding competence is relevant; as may be shown by reference to the pre­
paratory works and the teleology of this norm, the term competence is meant to 
include any national law affecting the treaty making competence of the acting 
State representative, also substantive limits like human rights. As a consequence, 
however, the violated internal provisions are not automatically relevant, but the 
State in question only has the right to a neutral conflict resolution procedure. This 
is to be confined to the incriminating provisions of the Treaty if those are separa­
ble from the rest of it. The procedure consists of two steps: first, of political ne­




























































































means were to fail, of a conciliation procedure to be carried out by a neutral dis­
pute settlement body. If however a party should deny participating in this proce­
dure within a reasonable delay, the presumption of PIL relevance, immanent in 
the allegation of manifest breach of essential internal law, becomes irrebuttable. 
Thus, the State in question may lawfully rely on the disapplication of the incrimi­
nating international provisions.
As will be shown in the following chapter, these rules also fit. even though only 
as ultima ratio, constitutional conflicts in the EC. First, the enactment of secon­
dary law may also be considered as a subtreaty to the original treaty, to which 
general treaty law may be applied. In applying the theory of evidence, the viola­
tion of internal law of the MSS, especially constitutional provisions, must also be 
contemplated; though again only with the consequence that the State in question 
will be given a right to a neutral conciliation procedure, in which the fate of the 
secondary law provisions at issue (and only them, since separability of the EC 
Treaty is the rule) will be definitively decided. As far as the single procedural 
steps are concerned, it has to be stated first that separate political negotiations 
among the parties are superfluous in the EC context, since the EC disposes of 
standing organs who can well be expected to do this job. The most difficult task 
is the handling of the conciliation procedure, since important deviations from the 
PIL model are necessary there: As the conciliation body de facto performs the 
task of constitutional adjudication, it must principally be democratically legiti­
mated in the EC context; therefore it must be set up by the EC legislator through 
a Treaty amendment; a regulation based on Art. 235 TEC would not be compati­
ble with the ancillary gap-filling function of this provision. The conciliation body 
should be entitled to take binding decisions erga omnes as to the relevance of the 
national constitutional standard in EC law, and, in the case of conflicts, its opin­
ions should take precedence over ECJ rulings. By contrast, the PIL conciliation 
scheme as codified in the Vienna Convention (a neutral conciliation commission 
composed of five members which are nominated by the Executive of both parties 
on an ad hoc basis and issue non-binding reports on the settlement of the dispute) 
would not comply with the legality and democracy requirements of the EC. Thus, 
the application of PIL only shows that a conciliation solution is necessary, but it 
does not indicate what form, composition and procedure a conciliation organ 
should have. Finally, if the Community however denies the MS a conciliation 
procedure, the PIL legal consequence should be operative again: The State may 
lawfully discard the application of the incriminating EC law provisions.
Important legal implications in EC law, PIL, national constitutional law and le­
gal theory can be deduced from the concrétisation of Art. 5 TEC and F I TEU 
through the theory of evidence. In EC law, a MS has the right to invoke a mani­
fest violation of constitutional law as an exception to its duty of performance. A 
treaty violation procedure pursuant to Art. 169 TEC would henceforth only be 
admissible if the State in question refuses to obey the conciliation decision. Thus, 




























































































constitute an exception to the ECJ's jurisdiction and to the doctrine of unlimited 
supremacy of EC law, which may be limited through the exceptional "victory" of 
national law in the conciliation procedure. Next, to bridge the time until a con­
ciliation procedure can be carried out, all interim measures preparing such a pro­
cedure - especially measures capable of avoiding the "de facto-anticipation" of 
the decision by extra-legal factors - must be allowed by virtue of existing case 
law, constituting an exception to Art. 185, 186 TEU. Besides that, even if the fall­
back to the theory of evidence were denied under EC law, PIL would still be 
applicable as an emergency regime if a State decided to violate EC law by dis- 
applying a EC act. For this could only be done pursuant to the requirements of the 
theory of evidence; otherwise, there would be an additional massive breach of 
PIL. Thirdly, as to national constitutional law, it should be taken into considera­
tion (since otherwise, the homogenity requirements Art. 23 Basic Law imposes 
on the EC would become completely illusory) that, if there is a PIL procedure 
capable of decreasing the potential disintegrative effect of constitutional conflicts, 
German institutions are bound to make use of it. Thus, the setting aside of secon­
dary legislation without substantial efforts by German organs to establish a con­
ciliation procedure would also be contrary to national constitutional law. Finally, 
with regard to the theoretical reconstruction of the EC system, it may be noted 
that, through the establishment of a Union conciliation mechanism, the Union ap­
proaches a three-tier - federal or confederal - structure. This structure would be 
monistic to the extent that decisions by the conciliation body would be respected. 
Since the decision is however not binding de lege lata at the level of national 
constitutional law, the expression "limping monism" is proposed by analogy with 
conflict of laws terminology.
As to the chances of this solution coming into fruition, it must be conceded that 
a conciliation procedure is likely to be denied to the State asking for it by the EC 
claiming exclusive jurisdiction for the ECJ. Such a reaction would even be the 
logical consequence of the EC's (however unfounded, as shown) presumption of 
complete autonomy and unlimited supremacy of EC law over national constitu­
tional law. However, since it brings about the juridification of constitutional con­
flicts, the solution proposed here would still have considerable advantages even 
in this case. For the EC, the outcome would be positive in that the potential threat 
to destroy the uniformity of EC law would be decreased, and another "level of de- 
escalation" would be introduced. It would even be up to the EC to avoid any dan­
ger by setting up a conciliation procedure. The advantages for the MS lie in the 
fact that it does not any longer have to resort to clearly illegal devices in order to 
guarantee respect for its constitution. Particularly, the claim to respect common 
PIL standards rather than merely the alleged constraints of its own internal law 
would be more prone to sympathy by other MSS. Furthermore, by discarding the 
negative effects of the current regime, the positive effect of the national compe­
tence of constitutional review would become plain. In addition, this solution, even 




























































































the pathological points of unlimited autonomy and supremacy of EC law: and 
thus, it might ideally allow for a common solution in European and national con­
stitutional law as of these issues. Finally and most importantly, the threat of es­
tablishing a competing organ for constitutional adjudication puts the ECJ under 
the pressure to avoid constitutional conflicts. Thus, the solution might have the 
effect of a Solange III decision, and like its predecessors, it would prove most 
effective if it could contribute to preventing a violation of national constitutions 
by European acts. All this, however, could be attained without the negative fla­
vour of the current Cold War scenario by completing the Avignon bridge by a 
conciliation procedure. The result might be described with the metaphor of the 
Florentin Ponte Vecchio, i.e. a bridge on which one can find houses, the concilia­
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